Indermeet Kaur, J.

1. This second appeal has impugned the judgment dated 2.9.1989 which had endorsed the finding of the trial judge dated 23.7.1987 thereby dismissing the suit.

2. The appellant before this court is the plaintiff. The plaintiff is stated to be the owner/landlord of premises No. 63, Southern side. G.B.Road; shop No. 5446 had been let out to the defendant. Defendant had threatened that he would sub let, assign or otherwise part with the possession of shop in favour of a third person against a heavy premium. He would not permit the plaintiff to reoccupy the suit property. Accordingly, the plaintiff had filed the present suit seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the tenant from sub-letting, assigning or otherwise parting with the aforesaid suit property.

3. The trial judge framed four issues. While deciding issue No. 1 it was held that the suit is not maintainable. Reliance was placed upon the provisions of Section 108 (j) of the Transfer of Property Act.

4. The first appellate court vide its judgment and decree dated 2.9.1989 endorsed the finding of the trial judge but for different reasons. The contention before the first appellate court was whether a suit for permanent injunction by a landlord against the tenant restraining him from sub-letting or parting with the suit premises is maintainable or not. This contention was answered by placing reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 SC 752 Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) by Lrs. v. Union of India. The relevant extract relied upon in the impugned judgment is reproduced as under:

"Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations for determining whether Civil Court jurisdiction is excluded are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred.If however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognized by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the Civil Court's jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence."

Coming to the facts of the present case, before coming into force of the Delhi Rent Control Act in the year 1958, there was no pre-existing right available to a landlord/lessor, in Common law, restraining a tenant/lessee from subletting the premises, and it was only in the year 1958 when the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, came into force that a machinery was provided for the enforcement of right and both the right and the remedy were created by way of inserting Section 14 (1) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, And infality is attached to the proceedings done under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Therefore, even in the absence of a exclusionary provision, the civil court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred. Before the coming into force of the Delhi Rent Control Act in the year 1958, the tenant-lessee had every right to sublet the premises in terms of Section 108 (j) of the Transfer of Property Act, and Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, had not recognised any pre-existing right of the landlord in common law and in fact both the right and the remedy in case of subletting have been created uno flatu by the provisions of Section 14 (1) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Applying the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the considered opinion that a landlord has no right to seek injunction against a tenant/lessee restraining him from subletting or parting with the possession of the suit property as in such matters jurisdiction of the civil courts is impliedly bar