JUDGMENT :

Valmiki J Mehta, J

1. The challenge by means of this Regular First Appeal filed u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), is to the impugned judgment of the trial Court dated 12.10.2004 rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the appellants/plaintiffs have made bare and bald assertions in the pleadings which are not sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction to the civil Courts at Delhi. Counsel for the appellants has drawn my attention to para 23 of the plaint which reads as under:-

23. This Hon'ble Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit as the goods of the Plaintiff and the Defendants are also sold in Delhi. The Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction u/s 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 as the Plaintiff has a branch office at New Delhi and its goods are extensively sold in Delhi.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that at the stage of deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the contents of the plaint have to be deemed to be correct and it cannot be argued that the plaint contains incorrect facts. It is argued that the scope of application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is not to pronounce on disputed question of facts and which can be done only after trial, and this issue is now well settled by various judgments of the Supreme Court including a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Pfizer Enterprises Sarl Vs. Cipla Ltd. 2009 (39) PTC 358 (Del.) (DB). The relevant observations of the Division Bench in the aforesaid case are contained in paras 12 to 15 and which read as under:-

12. The Preliminary Question which arose in Dhodha House was whether the existence of jurisdiction under Copyright Act, 1957 would also enable the clubbing of the dispute arising from the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958. The Supreme Court explained that existence of territorial jurisdiction by virtue of one Act would not clothe that very Court with a determination of a dispute under another Act only because of the provisions of Order II of the CPC (The parties in the P.M. Diesel were also one of the Appellants in the Dhodha House matter). Secondly, it had been observed that this Court had not adverted to the third contention that had arisen in the matter, viz. whether the Defendant had been selling its products on a commercial scale in Delhi. We think it necessary to at once clarify that in P.M. Diesel averments made in the Plaint have not been admitted in the Written Statement as is the case in the Pfizer Appeal. Our attention has also been drawn to the observations made by their Lordships in Dabur India Ltd. Vs. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595, where it was reiterated that since the primary ground upon which jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court had been invoked was violation of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 the provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 could not be invoked. This was also the ratio of Dhodha House. It was also observed that the Plaintiff in Dhodha House was not a resident of Delhi; that he had not been able to establish that it carried on any business at Delhi; for this purpose the question as to whether the Defendant had been selling its produce in Delhi or not was wholly irrelevant. The last of the three observations clarifies the position pertaining to the place where the Plaintiff transacts business. Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 enables the Plaintiff to institute any suit or proceedings in the District Court having jurisdiction over the territories where it "actually and voluntarily resides or carries business or personally works for gain". This is also what is postulated by Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. It was for this reason that their Lordships clarified that it was wholly irrelevant whether the Defendant was selling its products in the place where the suit had been filed. However, if the territorial jurisdiction is invoked by the Plaintiff on the ground of the cause of