JUDGMENT

[Physical Hearing/Hybrid Hearing (as per request)]

Rajiv Shakdher, J. (Oral):

Preface:

1. This is an appeal directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 04.03.2021, passed in an application preferred by the appellants under Section 36(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [in short `the 1996 Act'].

1.1. The said application was preferred by the appellants for staying the execution of the award dated 27.02.2019, passed by the arbitral tribunal.

1.2. The Learned District Judge (Commercial Court-02), West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [in short "the Learned District Judge"], while dealing with the aforementioned application, concluded that the main proceedings preferred by the appellants i.e., in the form of Section 34 petition was beyond limitation, and, therefore, both, the Section 36(2) application and the Section 34 petition, instituted under the 1996 Act, were not maintainable. This resulted in the dismissal of not only the Section 36(2) application but also the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.

1.3. It is against this order, as noticed above, that the appellants have preferred the present appeal.

2. Before we proceed further, there are two fundamental legal markers that need to be reiterated and concerning these markers, there can hardly be any doubt.

2.1. First, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the Section 34 proceedings filed under the 1996 Act. [See Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001)8 SCC 470 and Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019)2 SCC 455]

2.1(a). This position obtains on account of various courts including the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments holding that the 1996 Act is a special Act, and, therefore, the language of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act does not permit condonation of delay in filing a petition under Section 34 of the very same Act, beyond the prescribed period of three months and thirty [30] days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award.

2.1(b). The Supreme Court has, in the aforementioned judgements, in this behalf, laid emphasis on the expression "but not thereafter" found in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Supreme Court, in this context, has also referred to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 [in short `the 1963 Act'], which, inter alia, excludes the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act, where special acts or local laws, such as the 1996 Act, provide for specific period of limitation.

2.2. Second, although the provisions of Section 5 of the 1963 Act are not applicable to the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, Section 14 of 1963 Act is applicable. [See Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008)7 SCC 169 and M.P. Housing Board v. Mohanlal & Co., (2016)14 SCC 199]

Backdrop:

3. With this preface, what is required to be noticed for adjudicating the present appeal is the following dates and events, which are not, in dispute.

3.1. As noticed above, the award was rendered by the arbitral tribunal on 27.02.2019. It was received by the appellants, admittedly, on the same date i.e., 27.02.2019.

3.2. Evidently, the respondent had moved an application under Section 33(4) of the 1996 Act. The arbitral tribunal disposed of the said application, on 08.08.2019. It is, once again, not disputed by the appellants that the order concerning the disposal of this application was received by them on 08.08.2019.

3.3. The appellants lodged a petition with the Registry of this Court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, on 07.11.2019. Upon scrutiny by the Registry, the Registry pointed out thirty four (34) defects in the Section 34 petition lodged by the appellants on 11.11.2019.

3.3(a). Crucially, one of the defects pertained to the aspect concerning pecuniary jurisdiction. The Registry pointed out to the appellants that the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act did not conta