The central legal point established in the judgment is that the privatization of a public body may affect the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT

Jyoti Singh, J. (Oral)

1. Present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner seeking the following reliefs:

"a. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing of the order/letter dated August 03, 2017 as well as the order/letter dated July 09, 2018 issued by the Respondents to the Petitioner,

b. order restoration of the post-retirement entitlements including medical benefits of the Petitioner and her family, temporarily suspended vide letter dated August 03, 2017,

c. direct the Respondent Company to reimburse all the expenses incurred by the Petitioner towards all her entitlements from August 03, 2017 till date,

d. grant an interim stay on the letter dated August 03, 2017 issued until the pendency of this writ petition and direct the Respondent Company to continue to give all the retirement benefits to the Petitioner. A separate application has also been moved praying for the same."

2. Ms. Suruchi Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that as a result of disinvestment process initiated by the Government of India, Air India Limited ('AIL') has ceased to be a public body and therefore, no writ can lie against AIL in the circumstances that exist today. It is submitted that originally AIL was a statutory body constituted under the Air Corporations Act, 1953, however, post its repeal and in terms of the Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act, 1994, it had become a wholly owned company of the Government of India. It is at that stage that the present writ petition was filed, however, in light of the position that obtains today, where AIL has been privatized and the entire shareholding of the Government of India in AIL has been transferred to M/s. Talace Pvt. Ltd., (a wholly owned subsidiary of M/s. Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd.), no writ petition can lie under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as AIL is no longer a public body or Authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In order to support the submissions, Ms. Suruchi Suri, learned counsel for the Respondents relies on a judgment of this Court in Naresh Kumar Beri and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3585, relevant para of which is as under:

"23. The Court also finds merit in the second objection which was addressed on behalf of the respondents who had contended that since AIL had ceased to be a government company by virtue of the exercise of privatization noted above, the writ petition itself would cease to be maintainable. This Court notes that High Courts of the country appear to have consistently taken this position as would be manifest from a reading of the decision rendered in R.S. Madireddy by the Bombay High Court and Tarun Kumar Banerjee by the Karnataka High Court. The said position has also been duly reiterated in the judgments rendered by our Court in Asulal Loya, Ladley Mohan and Satya Sagar. The writ petition would thus warrant dismissal on this score also."

3. Mr. Karan Nagrath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, per contra, submits that the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court in R.S. Madireddy and Another v. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2657, dismissing the writ petition on account of disinvestment of AIL has been challenged before the Supreme Court and notice has been issued on 16.01.2023. Learned counsel also expresses an apprehension that if the writ petition is disposed of and Petitioner is left to resort to other remedies, AIL may, in future, disown its liability towards the Petitioner on the ground that it is privatized.

4. Ms. Suruchi Suri, in response, submits that albeit notice has been issued by the Supreme Court, as rightly contended by the counsel for the Petitioner, however there is no stay. She further submits that the apprehension expressed on behalf of the Petitioner is wholly misplaced inasmuch