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2023 Supreme(Del) 827

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Rekha Palli, J.
M/s. Automobiles Association of Upper India – Appellant
Versus
Bansraj Shukla & Ors. – Respondents
W.P.(C) 2335 of 2015
Decided On : 24-03-2023

Advocates appeared:
Dr. Lalit Bhasin, Ms. Nina Gupta, Ms. Ananya Marwqah & Mr. Ajay Pratap Singh, Advocates, for the Petitioner.

Headnote:

Recall of Order - Industrial Disputes Act - Section 17-B - [Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947] - The court dismissed the application seeking recall of the order allowing applications under Section 17-B of the Act. The court emphasized that proceedings under Section 17-B are independent and not dependent on the final order of the writ petition. It referenced the decision in Dilip Mani Dubey v. Siel Ltd. and highlighted that even if the termination order is upheld, the employer has no right to recover the amount paid under Section 17-B. The court also cited the decision in Kaivalyadham Employees Association v. Kaivalyadham S.M.Y.M. Samity, emphasizing that if an award for reinstatement is stayed at the instance of the employer, the employer is liable to pay full wages to the workman. The court found no merit in the petitioner's plea and dismissed the application.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought recall of the order allowing applications under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, stating that the applications were never pressed by the respondents and should not have been taken up for disposal.

Finding of the Court:

The court found no merit in the petitioner's submissions and dismissed the application, emphasizing that proceedings under Section 17-B are independent and not dependent on the final order of the writ petition.

Issues: The issues revolved around the recall of the order allowing applications under Section 17-B of the Act, the financial burden on the petitioner, and the maintainability of the applications after the impugned award was stayed.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the independence of proceedings under Section 17-B, referenced relevant case law, and found no merit in the petitioner's plea, leading to the dismissal of the application.

Final Decision: The application seeking recall of the order was dismissed by the court.

JUDGMENT

Rekha Palli, J. (Oral)

CM APPL. 14466/2023 (recall of order)

1. This is an application filed by the petitioner seeking recall of the order dated 27.02.2023, vide which the applications preferred under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act) by the respondent nos.1, 2, 4, 5 & 6 were allowed by this Court.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submits that the applications, having been filed in October 2015, were never pressed by the respondents and were therefore, directed to be heard along with the main petition. He, therefore, contends that there was no reason as to why the applications should have been taken up for disposal on 27.02.2023, when the writ petition was being adjourned.

3. He further submits that the petitioner is an Non Governmental Organization (NGO) and the directions issued vide order dated 27.02.2023 to pay arrears under Section 17-B of the Act will impose a huge financial burden on the petitioner especially when the contract for which the respondents were engaged already stands terminated. He, further, submits that once this Court, after finding prima facie merit in the writ petition, has already stayed the impugned award vide its order dated 10.03.2015, the applications under Section 17-B of the Act, were even otherwise not maintainable.

4. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and find absolutely no merit in the same. Merely, because the applications under Section 17-B of the Act, though filed by the respondents immediately upon receiving notice of the writ petition, have remained pending for many years, cannot be a ground to endlessly defer disposal of these applications which, by their very nature are required to be decided at the earliest.

5. It is well settled that proceedings under Section 17-B of the Act are independent proceedings and are not dependent on the final order, which may be passed in the writ petition wherein the award directing reinstatement of the workmen is assailed by the management. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Dilip Mani Dubey v. Siel Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 534, wherein it has been held that even if the Court eventually upholds the termination order as being legal against the workman, yet the employer will have no right to recover the amount under Section 17-B of the Act. The relevant extracts of the aforesaid decision read as under:

    "13. We, however, find that the High Court despite setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, rightly directed that whatever amount, which has so far been paid to the appellant workman by Respondent 1 employer in compliance with the order passed under Section 17-B of the ID Act proceedings during pendency of the litigation, the same will not be recoverable from the appellant on the strength of the impugned order. According to the learned counsel for Respondent 1 employer, this amount is quite a substantial one and is more than Rupees two lakhs. Be that as it may.

    14. Such direction issued by the High Court against Respondent 1 employer, in our view, is in conformity with the law laid down by this Court in that behalf. Indeed, this Court has held that the proceedings under Section 17-B of the ID Act are independent proceedings in nature and are not dependent upon the final order passed in the main proceedings.

    415. It is ruled that if the court/tribunal, eventually upholds the termination order as being legal against the workman, yet the employer will have no right to recover the amount already paid by him to the delinquent workman pursuant to order passed under Section 17-B of the ID Act during pendency of these proceedings (see Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel [Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel, (1999) 2 SCC 106: 1999 SCC (L&S) 466]; Dena Bank v. Ghanshyam [Dena Bank v. Ghanshyam, (2001) 5 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (L&S) 786] and Rajeshwar Mahto v. Birla Corpn. Ltd. [Rajeshwar Mahto v. Birla Corpn. Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 341: (2018) 1 SCC

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