The High Court reiterated that the exercise of inherent powers to direct FIR registration is an exception and requires clear demonstration of error or injustice.

JUDGMENT

1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by the applicant before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (for short, "learned MM") being aggrieved by the order dated 28th February, 2020, passed in C.C. No.24567/2019.

2. The petitioner had, along with her complaint, filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C.") seeking directions to the police for the registration of an FIR for the commission of offences under Sections 379/420/406/465/467/468/471/506/120B IPC against the respondents No.2 and 3 herein.

3. Mr. Shiv Ram Singh, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that the learned MM had fallen into error in dismissing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on the ground that on an earlier occasion, a similar application had been dismissed. It was submitted by the learned counsel that the fact situation was different when the earlier application had been dismissed, as the petitioner was not in possession of any document to substantiate her allegations. That was also the reason why she had withdrawn her first complaint. It was submitted that in a civil suit filed by the respondent No.2, he had filed copies of certain documents on the basis of which, the respondent No.2 claimed that he had purchased a part of the property from the petitioner. It was submitted that admittedly, the full consideration has not been paid by the respondent No.3, despite having been put in possession and the petitioner was thus defrauded of her valuable property. Her original documents were also stolen by the respondent No.3 and his associates. Despite these important facts, the learned MM had declined to direct the registration of the FIR to initiate police investigations. It was submitted that the respondents were not co-operating with the inquiry that the police had sought to make from them, as was evident from the Status Reports that they had submitted to the learned Trial Court. Thus, on the basis of new facts, the complaint being maintainable, the application also ought to have been entertained by the learned MM and directions issued to the police for the registration of the FIR and conduct investigations.

4. Mr.Rajinder Pal Singh, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Ms.Akanksha Choudhary, learned counsel for respondent No.3, on the other hand, submitted that the second application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was rightly dismissed by the learned MM as the facts, on the basis of which investigations were sought, were identical in both applications. It was also contended that the order dismissing the first application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was a speaking order on merits and therefore, the second application could not have been entertained by the learned MM and hence, it was rightly dismissed. In the replies of the respondents No.2 and 3, it was further submitted that the first complaint had also been withdrawn by the present petitioner, without leading any evidence. Therefore, the dismissal of the second application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was justified.

5. Mr.G.M.Farooqui, learned APP for the State also submitted that no cognizable offence was disclosed and therefore, the learned MM has rightly declined to issue directions for registration of the FIR.

6. While exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the court must be conscious of the scope of such powers. In a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., interference by this court, in exercise of its discretionary power can be only when clear perversity or error is disclosed on the face of the record.

7. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar Vs. State of Mah