The court affirmed that quashing of FIRs under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should only occur in rare cases where the allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence, emphasizing the need for evidence to substantiate claims of sexual harassment.

JUDGMENT

Jasmeet Singh, J. (ORAL)

1. This is a petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 44/2014 dated 07.03.2014, under Sections 354-A/509 IPC, registered at Police Station- Maurice Nagar, North Delhi District, New Delhi.

2. In the FIR, it has been stated by the complainant as under:

".... This is to inform you that on 21.01.2014 around 10:23 a.m. while crossing me in the corridor of the Mathematics Department, University of Delhi, Prof. Ajay Kumar (HOD- Maths University of Delhi) stared at me and passed lewd (wrongly spelt as lend in the complaint) sexual remarks to me which I am mentioning immediately made verbatim "Fuck you", As a result, I made a complaint to the Vice-Chancellor about this incident with a copy to the registrar which is a procedure for us to do. But no action/reply was received from the university authorities. Thus, you are requested to kindly lodge an FIR against Prof. Ajay Kumar, Department of Mathematics, University of Delhi for his act of sexual lewd remarks to me and also against Registrar, Ms. Alka Sharma and Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Dinesh Singh for protecting the sexual offender as more than 36 hours have elapsed since I lodged the complaint but no action has been taken by them..."

3. Mr Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the minutes of the ICC findings/observations and more particularly para 2, 4, 6, 6 and 7 which reads as under:

"2. ICC in its meeting decided to request the complainant to appear in person. The complainant, in turn, requested the ICC to transfer the respondent on the ground of threat to her safety. The complainant stated in her written submission that she will not appear in person until the respondent is transferred/suspended A close reading of her complaint dated 21 January 2014 shows that she wanted the VC to suspend the respondent with immediate effect and initiate an enquiry against him. Her subsequent communications suggest that she wanted the respondent to be suspended first and the enquiry be conducted thereafter.

Section 12 of the Act provides for measures like transfer of the aggrieved woman or the respondent, grant of leave up to three months to the aggrieved woman or grant of such other relief during the pendency of the enquiry. ICC observes that though it is vested with the power to recommend any of the measures suggested in Section 12(1) of the Act, it is a discretionary power vested in it. Once ICC decides to exercise such discretion under Section 12 of the Act, ICC has the discretion to decide on the appropriate measures too.

Therefore, Section 12 of the Act is explicit in its wordings that the complainant may make a request (in the form of a right), but she cannot insist on transfer/suspension of the respondent as a condition contingent upon which she will prefer to appear or not to appear before the ICC.

It is pertinent to note that the ICC in its meeting discussed the written request of the complainant seeking transfer/suspension of the respondent. After a perusal, of the documents the ICC recommended the following: "the requirements of fairness in the inquiry will be met if the complainant is not required to report to the Head of the Department or attend departmental meetings during the pendency of the inquiry". The University endorsed the recommendation of the ICC and a letter to that effect was sent to the complainant on 24 March 2014. She was advised that correspondence to the University may be forwarded through the Presiding Officer, ICC.

ICC, therefore, observes that it duly considered the request of the complainant under Section 12 of the Act and acted in good faith to a