NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, NEW DELHI
Anup K Thakur, Presiding Member and C. Viswanath, Member
Ajmer Vidyut Vitran
Nigam Limited —Petitioner
versus
Ram Singh —Respondent
Revision Petition No.1292 of 2019
(Against the Order dated 24/08/2018 in Appeal No. 832/2017 of the State Commission Rajasthan)
Decided on 5.7.2019
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner:Mr. Gautam Gupta, Advocate
IMPORTANT POINT
It is a settled proposition of law that condonation of delay is not a matter of right.
Headnote:
Consumer Protection Act, 1986—Section 21(b)—Revision—Delay of 190 days—Condonation of—Applicant has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons—Burden is put upon the applicant to show sufficient causes for the delay—Only reason given for delay is due to administrative procedure and change of counsels is not sufficient—Petitioner is required to instruct its employees to work and respect the law of the land—Held that, Petitioner has not been able to give sufficient reasons for condonation of delay. [Paras 6, 7, 10 and 11]
Result: Revision dismissed.
ORDER
C. Viswanath, Member—The present Revision Petition is filed by the Petitioner under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against Order passed by the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the “State Commission”) in FA No. 8322017 dated 24.08.2018.
2. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and also carefully perused the record.
3. The Petitioner filed IA No. 96132019, an application for condonation of delay of 190 days in filing the present Revision Petition. In the application for condonation of delay, the Petitioner contended that the impugned order was passed on 24.08.2018 and certified copy of the same was obtained on 30.08.2018. According to the Petitioner permission was obtained for filing the Revision Petition from their Head Office and thereafter counsel was engaged. Subsequently, on her elevation as Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, she discharged herself from the panel of counsels of the Department. Petitioner then contacted the present counsel. However, during the hearing, the Petitioner could not provide the dates of engaging the previous counsel in the matter and the date of her elevation as well as the date of her discharge from their panel.
4. There was a delay of more than 6 months in filing the present Revision Petition after deducting the prescribed period of 90 days for filing Revision Petition. This inordinate delay in filing the Revision Petition, much beyond the prescribed period, was explained by the counsel for the Petitioner in terms of engaging and changing of counsels and administrative delays. Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held in “Post Master Vs. Balram Singh Inaram Lodhi, III (2018) CPJ 53 (NC)” that Government Departments are not to be given any special privileges and they have to be treated like a common person and that Government Departments are under special obligation to perform their duty with due diligence and commitment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments”
5. The Petitioner appears to have not acted diligently and remained inactive for fairly a long time. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the settled legal proposition of law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes, though it may harshly affect a particular party. The Petitioner has not been able to give adequate and sufficient reason which prevented him to approach this Commission within the limitation.
6. It is a settled proposition of law that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the applicant has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons for not being able to come to the Court Commissions within the stipulated period of limitation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has held as under
“It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to su