The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the requirement of a reasonable and acceptable explanation for delay in filing appeals.

ORDER

1. This revision petition is directed against the order of the State Commission Punjab dated 12.07.2013 in First Appeal No. 102/2012 whereby the State Commission concurred with the order of the District Forum Ferozepur dated 19.10.2009 in CC No. 184 of 2009 and dismissed the appeal. The operative portion of the order of the District Forum reads as under:

"As order of Hon'ble U.T.State Commission, Chandigarh is regarding the same scheme and pertaining to another plot in the same area. So, we, on the same lines, order the opposite parties to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum to the complainants on the amounts deposited by them in two years after the deposit of the last instalment till the delivery of possession. The opposite parties are further directed to deliver the possession of the plot in question to the complainants within thirty days of the receipt of copy of this order. The opposite parties are also directed to complete the basic amenities within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The complainants are directed to pay the balance amount, if any, to the opposite parties within six months, failing which the opposite parties would be liable to charge interest/penal interest etc. However, the opposite parties would not be liable to charge penal interest if the complainants deposit the balance amount within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. With the above said observations, all the three complaints are allowed. File be consigned to record room.

2. The revision petition, however, has been filed after the expiry of period of limitation of 90 days as provided in Regulation 14 (i) of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 with a delay of 551 days as per the petitioner and 278 days as per the computation done by the Registry.

3. The petitioner has thus moved an application for condonation of delay being IA No. 368 of 2015 in RP No.141 of 2015. The explanation for delay in the application is that the revisionist is a Board constituted under the Statute and, therefore, it is required to follow the procedure for seeking approval before filing of the revision petition. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that delay in filing of the revision petition is unintentional and it has occurred because of consumption of time in following the bureaucratic procedure for seeking approval for filing the revision petition. It is further contended by the petitioner that law of limitation is not meant to shut the door of justice to the party and Court should be liberal while dealing with the condonation of delay application and while deciding the application, the substantial justice to the parties should be the main consideration. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Others (2005) 3 SCC 752.

4. Before adverting to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, it would be useful to have a look on the law relating to condonation of delay.

5. In Ram Lal and Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be l