( 1 ) THE following two questions have been referred for the decision of the Full Bench by our learned brother D. P. Desai J. (1) Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide whether a particular grant is a personal inam in view of Explanation I to sec. 2 (1) (e) of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 ? and (2) Whether the inams held by religious or charitable institutions and entered as such in the alienation register kept under sec. 53 of the Code or in the records kept under the rules made under the Pensions Act 1871 only are saved from the operation of the Act in view of the Explanation to sec. 3 of the aforesaid Act ?in so referring the two questions the learned Judge doubted the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in SAYED MOHMAD V. STATE (1966) 7 G. L. R. 217. The Division Bench in that case though at one stage posed the question whether the inam in question is a personal inam as defined in sec. 2 (1) (e) or whether it is an exempted inam falling under sec. 3 (2) later formulated the question in the following terms :the question before us is not whether the inam in question is a personal inam but quite a different question whether the said inam is an exempted inam under sec. 3 (2) of the Act. That made the learned Single Judge D. P. Desai J. after quoting a passage of the Division Bench at page 220 observe. SPEAKING with great respect the observations to be found in the first emphasized portion quoted above overlooks the very question posed by the learned Judges (which has been reproduced in the beginning of the above quotation ). As found in the beginning of the observations quoted earlier the question posed was whether the grant in question was a personal inam or whether it is an exempted inam If that was the question posed speaking again with respect it cannot be said that the question before the Division Bench was not whether the grant was a personal inam and that the real question was whether the grant was an exempted inamhe ultimately opined. . . . . there is much that can be said with regard to the second emphasized portion of the aforesaid quotation (in 7 G. L. R. 220) which contains the submission made on behalf of the State Government before the Division Bench if we look at the scheme of the Act as a whole. Therefore two questions will arise for determination in this case by a larger bench as I do not feel inclined to agree with the deter mination of these questions by the Division Bench in Sayed Mohmeds case (Supra ). That is how this First Appeal is before us.

( 2 ) THE facts relevant for purpose of determining the two questions referred to us may be briefly stated. The plaintiff who is the appellant is a Sajjadanshin of the religious institution known as Edroos-Durgha of Hazrat Sayedina Mohomed Bin Abdulla El-Edroos at Surat. In the act. ion brought by him in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Surat he asked for a declaration that the village Orma with which we are now concerned is an inam village held by the religious institution of Edroos-Durghas (i. e. shrines i e. Rouzas) and that the provisions of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Personal Inams Abolition Act) sec. 2 Clause C sec. 4 and provisions of Act No. 50 of 1953 are not applicable to the suit village in view of Clause 2 of sec. 3 of the said Personal Inams Abolition Act. On that ground he asked for an injunction against the defendant the then State of Bombay restraining it and its officers and servants from taking any action under the said Act. The defendant inter alia contended that the suit village is a personal inam within the meaning of sec. 2 (1) (e) of the Personal Inams Abolition Act and that the State Government alone is competent to decide the question whether the grant is a personal inam or not. In other words the case of the State Government is that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question whether the gra