( 1 ) THE present revision application is directed against the order passed by the learned JMFC Vijapur in Criminal Case No. 1104 of 1983 rejecting the complainants prayer that his private Advocate Mr. M. M. Shah be permitted to conduct the case on behalf of the prosecution. The learned Magistrate was of the opinion that such a request cannot be granted. He therefore rejected the said application and the said order is being sought to be challenged before me.

( 2 ) MR. M. M. Shah the learned advocate appearing for the complainant-petitioner drew my attention to sec. 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads as under:"301 The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a ease may appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in which that case is under inquiry trial or appeal. (2) If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor and may with the permission of the Court submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case". Adverting to the phraseology employed in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 301 Mr. Shah urged that while the Assistant Public Prosecutor shall always be in charge of the prosecution in the instant case what was prayed by the complainant-petitioner was not to handover the charge of the conduct of the case to a private advocate but he had only prayed that while the charge of the conduct of the case remained in the hands of the prosecutor private advocate shall be permitted to act on behalf of the complainant under the directions of the Prosecutor. In this behalf Mr. Shah drew my attention to a case reported at 1959 Andhra Pradesh P. 659 (Medichetty Ramakistiah and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh) where the Division Bench of the said High Court was expounding upon the word Act occurring in sec. 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Old) which is equivalent to sec. 301 extracted above of the New Code. The Division Bench observed as under:"the word Act in see. 493 is not to be understood in the technical sense as meaning something distinct and different from the word Plead. It does not mean something other than examining or cross-examining witnesses or addressing the court and is not used in any technical sense in distinction from the words appear and plead in the opening part of the section. When sec. 493 authorises a privately engaged pleader to act in the case under the directions of the Public Prosecutor he may do everything in the ease provided that it is done under the control and direction of the Public Prosecutor".

( 3 ) MR. Shah also drew my attention to a case reported in AIR 1967 Punjab P. 42 (Roop K Shorey v. The State) wherein also the learned Single Judge of the said court observed in para 5 as under:"the word act in sec. 493 Criminal Procedure Code is not used in its technical sense in contradistinction to appear and plead. In the context this expression means and includes the power to examine and cross-examine witnesses and address the Court"

( 4 ) MR. Shah also urged that even under sec. 302 of the Code the Magistrate was empowered to permit the prosecution to be con- ducted by any person other than a Public Officer. . . . and sub-sec. (2) of the said section provides that any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. The application was given under sec. 301. Sec. 302 in the instant case does not come into operation at all and Mr. Jani the learned advocate appearing for opponent No. 2 that is original accused urged that the point raised by Mr. Shah is covered by a Division Bench judgment of our High Court consisting of Potti C. J. and S. B. Majmudar J. in Special Criminal Application No 1092 of 1983 decided on 15/12/1983. In the said