( 1 ) SIX different appellants have filed this six appeals against the same respondent, namely, the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, challenging almost the uniform judgment and decree of the learned City Civil judge, 6th Court, Ahmedabad, dismissing the six different suits filed by them, on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

( 2 ) THE different plaintiffs, who are the employees of the defendant- corporation filed different suits for a declaration that the charge-sheet issued by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner, appointment of the Inquiry officer, proceedings initiated by him, the show cause notice issued to the plaintiffs and the final order removing the plaintiffs from the employment, are mala, fide, illegal, punitive, against the principles of natural justice, without proper delegation of power, in colourable exercise of power, against the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, against the rules and regulations and procedure prescribed thereunder and against Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The plaintiffs have challenged the termination order and the procedure followed by the Disciplinary authority as being null and void and they have also sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendant-Corporation from taking any steps pursuant to the final order of termination. It is not necessary to go into the details of each individual case.

( 3 ) THE defendant-Corporation contended in its written statement that the suit was barred by Sec. 487 of the BPMC Act, that the suit is barred because of the fact that the defendant-Corporation has already made an application under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 5-2-1987 and that the plaintiff is a workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. It is not necessary to refer to the reply of the Corporation on factual aspect. In short, the defendant has contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute raised by the plaintiff as they can be eminently resolved under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.

( 4 ) THE learned Judge of the City Civil Court found that the plaintiff was a workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, that the Civil court could not grant the relief of reinstatement of a workman with back wages, that the relief of declaration prayed for by the plaintiff was impliedly a prayer for reinstatement that the plaintiff-workman can get such a relief under the Standing Order passed by the Municipal Corporation, and so, this question can be decided only by the Industrial Court, and not by the Civil court. The learned Judge, therefore, dismissed the suits.

( 5 ) MR. M. B. Gandhi, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant in each case, has submitted that if the authority issuing a charge-sheet, or passing the order of termination is not competent under the law, his order ex facie is null and void , and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to approach the industrial Court for getting such a declaration. According to Mr. Gandhi the deputy Commissioner, who initiated the inquiry proceedings and passed the order of termination was not competent under the provisions of the Bombay provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, to take any such action against the plaintiffs. Mr. Gandhi has referred to the provisions of Secs. 53, 56, 67 and 68 of the said Act. Under Sec. 53, the power of appointing certain municipal Officers vests in the Corporation, but the power of appointing other officers and servants vests in the Commissioner. As per explanation (1) to sec. 56, the authority who is competent to make the appointment is also competent to impose the penalties specified in sub-sec. (2) on the Municipal officer or servant. As per Sec. 67 (3) of the Act, subject to the approval or sanction of the Corporation or Standing Committee, and subject to the other limitations and conditions imposed by the Act, or by any other law, the entire executive power of the