S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, C. J.

( 1 ) IN these Special Civil Applications, petitioners, who are individuals, on the simple ground they jointly purchased or acquired vacant land, have been treated as a single unk for the purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) act 23 of 1976 (hereinafter refeued to as "the Act" ). When the petitioners challenged this action on the pan of the authorities by preferring the Special Civil Applications, pleading that they are owners holding definite earmarked shares and hence, they must be held to be tenants-in-common and for the purpose of the Act, their definite specified shares in the vacant land, alone could be taken note of, the learned single Judge, even though there is a pronouncement of another learned single Judge of this Court, expressed in Smt. Savitaben Wlo. Shri Shantilal C. Shroff and others vs. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 (1) G. L. H. 186, deemed fit to refer these Special Civil Applications for consideration to a Bench. The main reason, as we could see from the order of reference, which weighed with the learned single Judge is that in the pronouncements of the Apex court, as well as the pronouncements of the High Court of Bombay, though dealing with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, a different note has been struck.

( 2 ) THE petitioners jointly purchased or acquired the vacant lands in question. Each petitioners share is defined and specified and in that view, the petitioners can be said to be only "tenants-in-common". However, on a theory that the petitioners have not got their shares separated by metes and bounds, the authorities proceeded to deal with the petitioners in each case as one unit. The Act defines a person under Section 2 (i) thereof as follows:"2. Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires (i) "person" includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;" the learned single Judge in Smt. Savitaben W/o. Shri Shantilal G. Shroff and others, vs. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 (1)G. L. H. 186, dealt with a case arising under the Act, where co-owners held specified shares and after recapitulating the basic proposition "when owners hold definite earmarked shares in a common property, they can be said to be tenants in common", expressed his views as follows: "it is difficult to appreciate how respondent No. 2 persuaded himself to hold that co-owners of well defined shares in a joint property ceased to be individuals holding specified shares of the property on the appointed day. Division by metes and bounds is not the requirement of law for considering holdings of the concerned individuals as per Section 3 of the Act An individual may hold exclusively any vacant land or may hold vacant land in common with other co-owners but in specified shares. Merely because he holds some vacant land in specified shares jointly with other co-owners, he does not cease to be individual qua his holding of vacant land in specified shares. The emphasis put by second respondent on actual division of land by metes and bounds for the purpose of applicability of Section 3 of the Urban Land Act is patently erroneous in law and cannot be justified. "the learned single Judge referred to the following observations in an unreported judgment of a Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 834 of 1978, decided on 14. 7. 1981:"it is well settled that where the property is held by tenants in common having a defined share, then the holders could not be treated as joint holders merely on the ground that the property is not divided by metes and bounds. The assumption of the competent authority that as long as the property is not divided by metes and bounds, it is imperative to consider undivided holding as holding of a body individuals is clearly wrong. On the first principle itself, it is impossible to sustain the conclusion recorded by the competent authority. Apart from that fa

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