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1994 Supreme(Guj) 70

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :J.M.Panchal
CHANDRAMATI D.THAKORE - Appellant
Versus
JAYANTILAL DAHYALAL JANI - Respondent
S.C.A. 4324 of 1984
Decided On : 03/16/1994

Advocates Appeared: B.D.DESAI, J.V.DESAI, K.M.Mehta, V.C.DESAI, V.P.Shah

Headnote:

Criminal Law – Criminal Trial – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 – Section 66 (1) (b) – Found in possession of illicit liquor – Convicted – Sought for enhancement of sentence – Prosecution case on three different dates, was found in possession of illicit liquor of the quantity - 2 litres, 16 litres and 2 litres respectively in the public place at Kadi. Thereafter, when challaned before Court, he pleaded guilty and learned Magistrate accepting the same, convicted and sentenced him as stated above in para-1 of this judgment giving rise to the present three appeals for enhancement of sentence – Held, This in turn ex-facie infrings Art. 21 of the Constitution of India, going to the roots vitiating the entire trial. This situation reduces the proceedings to square one and relegates the accused to his original position where he was at the commencement of the trial. Viewed from this angle, in case of pleabargaining the accused has indeed no right to be heard on the point disputing the courts discretion to remand the case – Strictly speaking, the patent illegal procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate of recording plea-bargaining is the matter between this Court and the Court of Magistrate, more particularly when this Court does not enhance the sentence – Neither any legal nor moral justification for the respondent to claim hearing of such matter at admission stage and court would be prefectly justified in remanding the matter ex-partie – Taking into consideration the fact that impugned judgment and orders are prima-facie perverse, an attempt also to undermine and subvert the Legislative honour and the particular provisions under the Prohibition Act, same is ex-facie unjudicious and in that view of matter, unbecomingness on the part of the learned Magistrate, the same is required to be brought to the notice of all concerned – Directions issued – Appeals partly allowed.

J. M. PANCHAL, J.

( 1 ) THE order dated February 14, 1984 passed by the Gujarat secondary Education Tribunal (the Tribunal for short) in Application No. 148 of 1982 is the subject-matter of challenge in these two petitions which are instituted under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. In Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984, the declaration granted by the Tribunal to the effect that the respondent no. 1 therein is entitled to receive the compensation equivalent to 13 months salary including allowances on the basis of the last pay, is challenged whereas in special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984, the declaration granted by the Tribunal to the effect that the respondent No. 1 therein is entitled to receive the compensation equivalent to 16 months salary including the allowances on the basis of the last pay she was receiving in the School is challenged. Both these petitions arise out of the common order dated February 14, 1984 and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

( 2 ) IN the year 1981-82, there were five classes of Standard VIII to X in D. P. High School, Khadia, Ahmedabad and in all, there were seven teachers including the Principal. Due to insufficiency of number of students, the management was obliged to reduce one class as a result of which, the management was also required to relieve one teacher. The management thereupon approached the District Education officer, who after hearing the Principal of the School and the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984, passed an order giving permission to relieve the said respondent from service. Pursuant to the permission, service of the said respondent were terminated by the management. Thereupon the respondent no. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 moved the Tribunal by way of filing Application No. 148 of 1982 challenging the order of termination.

( 3 ) IN the meantime, while the said application was pending, one more class was required to be reduced in the year 1983-84 and, therefore, again the management approached the District Education Officer for his permission to remove one more teacher. The District Education Officer, after taking into consideration the seniority list of the teachers, the qualifications possessed by them and the subject-wise requirements, accorded approval to terminate the services of the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984. The respondent No. 1 of the said petition thereupon preferred Application No. 186 of 1983 before the Tribunal challenging the order of termination for her services passed by the management consequent upon approval granted by the District Education Officer. As both the applications were directed against the same management and common evidence was required to be recorded, the Tribunal disposed of both the applications by a common judgment and order dated September 30, 1983. After taking into consideration the relevant factors, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the termination of services of both the employees was just and proper and that there was no breach of provisions of Sec. 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 (the Act for short ). In that view of the conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed both the applications.

( 4 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order, the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil application No. 4326 of 1984 preferred Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983 before this Court. After hearing the parties, this Court (Coram: A. P. Ravani, j.), passed the following order on November 16, 1983 : "the petition is directed against the order of Secondary Education Tribunal. No illegality or infirmity is found in the impugned order so as to exercise my powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Hence rejected. However, after hearing the counsel for the D. E. O. , Respondent No. 3 herein, it is directed that the salary paid and/or payable to the petitioner for the period during which interim relief operated, the sam


























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