Gujarat High Court
Judgename :S.D.Shah
MUNSHIRAM D.ANAND - Appellant
Versus
PRAVINSINH PRABHATSINH - Respondent
C.A. 1122 of 1993
Decided On : 01/11/1996
Important Point : Provisions of chapter X of Moter Vehicles Act, 1988, have overriding effect not withstanding any thing contained in any other provision of the Act, or of any other law for the time being in force.
2. Loading of a petition for compensation under S. 166 is not a condition precedent to filing of a petition for interim compensation on principle of the fault liability under S. 140 of the Act.
Sec. 142 also does not provide that for filing an application or a petition for interim compensation, one must always file a petition for compensation under Section 166. In other words, lodging of a petition for compensation under Section 166 is not a condition precedent to filing of a petition for interim compensation on the principle of no fault liability. In my opinion, to control or limit operation of Sec. 140 to those cases where a substantive petition under Sec. 166 of the said Act of 1988, is filed and is pending, would tantamount to giving a very limited scope to a beneficial piece of legislation which is enacted for the benefit of the class of claimants, either heirs and legal representatives of the deceased or injured persons in vehicular accident. The Legislature has advisedly therefore, no where stated in Sec. 140 that application for interim compensation can be made only if a substantive petition under Sec. 166 is filed. Secondly, the Legislature has also nowhere prescribed the period of limitation within which the application for interim compensation can be made under Sec. 140 of the said Act. Therefore, accepting the submission of Mr. N.K. Phava, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, would in substance, amount to reading something more in Sec. 140 than what the Legislature has enacted. It would amount to prescribing the period of limitation for filing such application when the Legislature has not thought fit to prescribe any period of limitation. Secondly, it would also amount to introducing one another requirement of pendency of a substantive petition under Section 166 for compensation, which is also not the situation stipulated by Section 140. Thirdly, to introduce such a condition in Sec. 140 would in fact frustrate the object of the Legislature of providing interim maintenance at the earliest possible opportunity. The injured person or the legal representatives can move the Tribunal for interim compensation within a week even before filing a petition under Sec. 166 of the Act and the Tribunal is bound, if requirements of Sec. 140 are satisfied, to award the interim compensation. The provisions of Chapter-X are intended to have the overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, Chapter-XII which deals with the Claims Tribunal and Sec. 166 which finds it place in Chapter-XII, cannot have overriding effect over Sec. 140 in light of the aforesaid clear statutery provisions enacted by Sec. 144 of the said Act. The legislature has in no uncertain terms made its intention clear by providing that provisions of Chapter-X shall have overriding effect and irrespective of any liability, If requirements of Sec. 140 are satisfied, the Tribunal can pass an award for interim compensation, in favour of the Claimant.
[Para 5]
( 1 ) THIS Civil Appeal is preferred by original opponent No. 1 in petition filed under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before Motor accident Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary) at Jamnagar. The opponent Pravinsinh prabhatsinh instituted such petition under Sec. 140 of the said Act inter alia claiming that on 16/02/1990 around 10. 15 in the morning because of rash and negligent driving by the present appellant of his Fiat Car bearing No. GRI 8061 on Jamnagar-Rajkot Road, there was an accident as the car dashed against the scooter and he received multiple injuries including fracture of left leg and foot. He also stated that he has received 50% permanent disability and that he has also filed regular motor Accident Claim Petition to recover compensation of Rs. 3,66,000. 00. He has further stated that during the pendency of such petition, he has filed application at Exh. 18 for interim compensation under Sec. 140 of the said Act. Such application was fixed for hearing by the Tribunal on 22/10/1992 and ultimately by judgment and award dated 22nd of October, 1992, the Tribunal has awarded the interim compensation of Rs. 12,000. 00 under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the said amount is deposited by the appellant in the Tribunal.
( 2 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and interim award passed by the Tribunal, the owner of the vehicle has preferred the present Civil Appeal and in such First appeal, Mr. N. K. Phava, appearing with Mr. P. M. Thakker has strenuously urged before this Court that the Tribunal could not have awarded interim compensation of Rs. 12,000. 00 as the main Motor Accident Claim Petition which was instituted by the claimant was already dismissed. He submitted that accident admittedly took place on 16th of February, 1990 for which the Motor Accident Claim Petition was filed on 5th of September, 1991, i. e. , beyond the maximum period of one year then provided by Sec. 166 of the said Act. Section 166 (3) as it then stood contemplated that every application for compensation under Sec. 166 (2) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred. Sub-section (3) provides that - no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso, however, contemplated that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant-claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.
( 3 ) THE effect of the aforesaid provision was fully discussed in the case of Mer ramde Vejanandbhai v. Harshadbhai Parbatbhai, reported in 1992 (2) GLR 976 wherein this Court has taken the view that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay over a period of one year from the date of the accident. The petition lies as of right within a period of six months but if there is delay, the Tribunal could condone the same between six months to 12 months and not beyond 12 months. The Parliament has subsequently realised the adverse effect of such provision on the rights of claimants of vehicular accident and has, therefore, by amendment which has come into force w. e. f. 14/11/1994, by Amendment Act No. 54 of 1994, deleted the entire sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The effect of such amendment is that the Motor Accident Claim petition could now be preferred at any point of time as no limitation is prescribed, subject of course to the reasonableness of the period and applicability of the provisions of Limitation act, 1963, if at all, same is applicable. Such question is not examined in this First appeal as it does not directly arise for consideration. However, in the present case, when the petition was filed, on 5th of September, 1991, Sec. 166 (3) operated and as per the said provision read with the aforesaid decision of this Court, it wa
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