1997 Supreme(Guj) 25
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :S.K.Keshote
Kana Ruda Bharwad - Appellant
Versus
Gujarat Water Supply AND Sewage Board - Respondent
S.C.A. 4710 of 1983
Decided On : 01/13/1997
Advocates Appeared: D.G.CHAUHAN, H.L.JANI, M.D.RANA, M.G.DOSHIT
Headnote:(a) Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 16 & 226 - Order of termination - Defence of delay & laches as order made giving effect from 7.7.1976 while petition filed in year 1983 - Court considered the facts & found that petitioner had not slept over the matter all this period but had filed Civil Suit & was taking proceedings in Civil Court wherein he was directed to seek redress by raising industrial dispute - As such petitioner can not be faulted on ground of delay & laches.The petitioner in the present case cannot be blamed for delay and laches. The order of termination of his services has been challenged by the petitioner admittedly, by filing a civil suit and in the civil suit, the civil court (Trial Court) decided the matter in his favour and the order of termination was held to be invalid and inoperative as being violative of provisions of Sec. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947. The matter was taken up in the appeal by the respondent-State and there the contention appears to have been that the petitioner being a workman and the case has been made out of violation of Sec. 25F of the Act, 1947, the proper remedy would have been of raising an industrial dispute and not the civil suit. That contention found favour with the appellate court and the suit has been dismissed. So taking into consideration these facts, it cannot be said that the petitioner has slept over his right, but he was vigilant and he agitated his right though not before the labour court, but before civil court. In view of this fact, on which there is not dispute, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent Shri D.G. Chauhan is devoid of any substance.[Para 6](b) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sec. 25F - Termination in violation of provision under - Condition - Claimant has to establish as a fact that he has worked for 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination - Petitioner having failed to make out any case of his working for 240 days challenge to order on ground of violation of provision under not sustainable.Where the petitioner pleads it to be a case of violation of provisions of Sec. 25F of I.D. Act, 1947 then he has to establish as a fact that he has worked for 240 days in twelve calender months preceding the date of termination. It is true that the petitioner may not have worked continuously for 240 days or there may be break in the services also, but he has to establish as a fact that during twelve calender months preceding the date of termination he worked in the establishment for 240 days. That is the mandatory requirement and unless it is established as a fact, the termination of the services of the petitioner cannot be held to be in violation of Sec. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947. The petitioner has to stand on his own merits or has to stand on his legs and he cannot shift his burden on the respondent which initially heavily lies upon him. Merely stating that the petitioner has worked for 240 days, it is not sufficient more so when the respondent has come up with a case that the petitioner has not worked for 240 days. It is a disputed question of fact otherwise also, on which this court will not make an inquiry. In the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution if a fact is in dispute, then this court will not make an inquiry and the petition deserves to be dismssed on this ground. As the petitioner has failed to make out any case of his working for 240 days in the twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination of his services, the challenge to the order of termination on the ground of violation of provisions of Sec. 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 is not sustainable.[Para 9](c) Service & Employment - Termination - Temporary appointment for a fixed period - No notice or opportunity of hearing is required to be given while terminating his services - Petitioner was given appointment for fixed term of 29 days - No order of extension produced by him - So there may be possibility of further appointments also for fixed terms - No enforceable right to the post had accrued to petitioner - Order of termination of his service cannot be termed arbitrary or illegal.The petitioner has been given fixed term appointment for 29 days and the petitioner has not produced the order of extension as it is a case where the services of the petitioner were continued by giving some break. So there may be possibility of giving appointment all the time for fixed term. So appointment comes to an end by efflux of time. Until the temporary service matures into permanent, the holder thereof has no right to the post. At any time or at any point of time before that right accrues to the employee, it is open to the employer to terminate the services in terms of the order of appoinetment. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondents have no power to terminate his services. The petitioner has no right to the post and in case when the work was not available and his services were terminated, it cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal.[Para 11]
S. K. KESHOTE, J.
( 1 ) THE petitioner is challenging in this petition the order dated 29th May, 1976 made by Dy. Engineer, Public Health Department, Junagadh under which the services of the petitioner were terminated.
( 2 ) THE facts of this case in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed as work-charged Chowkidar under, the order of the Executive Engineer, Junagadh Public health Division in the pay-scale of 90-110 for 29 days only. The appointment order was given effect from 18th April, 1975. The services of the petitioner came to be terminated under the order impugned in this Special Civil Application and the copy of this order has been filed at annexure b. The termination of the services has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is illegal, resulting in violation of Art. 16. of the constitution and Sec. 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The ground of challenge is also made that the junior has been retained in the service whereas the service of the senior has been terminated. Reference in this respect has been made to the case of one dhanjibhai who was appointed as Oil man on 12th May, 1975.
( 3 ) THE counsel for the respondent Shri D. G. Chauhan, on the other hand, contended that the petitioners services were terminated with effect from 7-7-1976 and this petition has been filed by the petitioner in the year 1983, and as such, it deserves to be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. It has next been contended that the petitioner filed a civil suit challenging thereunder the order of termination of his services and that suit was decreed by the Trial Court on the ground that the services of the petitioner has been terminated in violation of provisions of Sec. 25f of the I. D. Act, 1947, but that decision has been reversed by the appellate court on the ground that in the matter where the workman claims the termination of services to be in violation of provisions of I. D. Act, then proper forum for agitating that claim is Labour court. Instead of approaching to the labour court thereafter the petitioner filed this petition. It has next been contended that the petitioner is challenging the termination of his services on the ground of violation of provisions of Sec. 25f of the I. D. Act, and as such, the remedy provided under the said act could have been only appropriate remedy and not this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution of India. On merits, the counsel for the respondent Shri D. G. Chauhan, contended that the petitioner has not worked for 240 days and as such, the compliance of provisions of Sec. 25f of the I. D. Act, 1947 need not be made in the present case. Carrying this contention further, Shri Chauhan contended that otherwise also it was a case of fixed term appointment and it has come to an end by efflux of time for which no notice or opportunity of hearing was required to be given. Lastly, the counsel for the respondent contended that it is a case of temporary appointment of the petitioner without any selection, and as such, the respondents have all the right to terminate the services of the petitioner.
( 4 ) THE counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder to the submissions made by the counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of Special civil Application No. 1910/76 on 3. 5. 1977 and contended that the matter is squarely covered in favour of the petitioner. The petitioners in that case were also the persons who were appointed like the petitioner at different schemes of respondent No. 1 and their services were terminated, but this court has held the termination of the services to be arbitrary, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
( 5 ) THE petitioners counsel stated that he filed a C. A. for amendment of the writ petition. That C. A. has not been placed on the board, but I have taken the copy of C. A. from the petitioner and gone through the contents thereof. Through C. A. , the petitioner wanted to bring on re
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