( 1 ) THIS appeal from order is directed against the order dated 11th August, 1998 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No. 18, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, below Exh. 5 (notice of motion) in Civil Suit No. 3266 of 1998 whereunder the ad-interim relief granted by the Trial Court earlier has been vacated.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel, for the parties do not dispute that the application Exh. 5 was filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). So this appeal is under Sec. 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code.

( 3 ) GRANT of interim injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code is discretionary and-equitable relief, though the discretion is to be exercised judiciously. An appeal against discretionary order or order of equitable relief under Sec. 104 read with Order 41 rule l (r) of the Code is an appeal against interlocutory discretionary order, and an order passed in equitable jurisdiction, and the powers of the appellate Court in such appeal are not as wide as are of the appellate Court in a regular appeal against decree. Appellate court hearing appeal under Sec. 104 read with Order 41 Rule 1 (r) of the Code will interfere with discretionary order by the Court of first instance, and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law regarding grant or refusal of interlocutory injuctions. So an appeal against a discretionary order can conveniently be said to be an appeal on principle. In such case the appellate court will not reassess the material and reach to a conclusion different from the one reached by the learned Trial Court solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the Trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in judicious manner, the fact that this Court as appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court exercising discretion.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the parties have addressed in this appeal their contentions as if this Court is sitting on original side. I frankly concede that this Court has also granted some latitude to the learned advocates for the parties, to a certain extent, to address the matter as if it is the original Court. But the learned advocates have not taken that much of liberty and have not misused the liberty granted by this Court. It desrves appreciation by the Court that both the learned counsel for the parties, despite having been given this latitude by the Court, were very precise, to the point and brief in making their submissions.

( 5 ) AS this is an appeal under Sec. 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code and looking to the fact that this Court has a very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court, and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this appeal itself lies only on the principle, and I do not consider it necessary to set forth in this order the facts of the case in detail. The facts of the case are given in detail in the impugned order by the learned Trial Court, and that is another reason which persuaded me not to give out in extenso the facts of the case. However, I could not refrain from observing at this stage one important aspect. The pleadings of this appeal have been made by the learned counsel for the parties voluminous more than what it was necessary. The record has been made voluminous in two ways. Firstly, by making bulky pleadings in the form of memo of appeal, civil applications, reply affidavit, counter affidavit, etc. . and secondly, by producing additional documentary evidence in the appeal. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant filed Civil Application No. 7469 of 1998 and 8334 of 1998 purporting to be under Orde