( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under section 96, CPC, at the instance of the appellant who was the plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 1395/98, and who was also the defendant in Special Civil Suit No. 700/2000.

( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised in the present appeal, it is first necessary to appreciate the factual background. The facts so far they are relevant and pertinent to the decision in the present appeal are not in dispute.

( 3 ) THE present appellant as the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1395/98 before the trial court. It is pertinent to note that in the said suit the appellant-plaintiff had not sought any decree for any declaration whatsoever. The only relief sought in the said suit was for a permanent prohibitory injunction seeking to restrain the defendant of that suit (the present respondent) from disturbing the possession of the appellant-plaintiff in respect of the suit property, and/or from dispossessing the appellant-plaintiff. As against the aforesaid suit, the present respondent as plaintiff had filed Special Civil Suit No. 700/2000, firstly for a declaration that he was the owner of the suit property and therefore entitled to retain lawful possession of the suit property, for a further declaration that the appellant-defendant was not a tenant or a licensee in respect of the suit premises, and for a consequential relief by way of a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellant-defendant from disturbing the lawful possession of the respondent-plaintiff. 3. 1 it is also pertinent to note that in the suit filed by the appellant, as aforesaid, he had not sought for any declaration in respect of, or as regards, the legality of his possession and/or right to retain legal possession of the suit property. It was only by way of narrating background facts that the appellant-plaintiff had pleaded in the suit plaint that he was a member of the family of the respondent-defendant and was therefore entitled as of right to retain possession of the suit property. 3. 2 looking to the fact that these were two cross-suits between the very same parties, that the subject matter of dispute was the very same property, and that the reliefs sought by each plaintiff in their respective suits were similar, the trial court by consent of parties consolidated the two suits and directed that they be tried together. Consequently the two suits were consolidated, common issues were raised, common evidence was led, and the two suits were decided by a common judgement. As a result of the said common judgement, the suit filed by the present appellant viz. Regular Civil Suit No. 1395/98 was dismissed, whereas the suit filed by the respondent viz. Special Civil Suit No. 700/2000 was allowed. It is pertinent to emphasise at this stage that although the judgement was common, it dealt with two separate suits and consequently the common judgement resulted in two separate and distinct decrees.

( 4 ) AS aforesaid, this is an appeal under section 96, CPC, filed by the appellant, challenging the decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 700/2000, in the suit filed by the respondent (which suit had been decreed mainly in terms of the prayers made in the said suit ).

( 5 ) IN the context of the present appeal arising only from the decree passed in the respondents suit, the respondent herein raised an objection as to the maintainability of the appeal. In this context the respondent contended that although the two suits were decided by a common judgement, each suit resulted in a separate and independent decree, and that therefore an appeal filed from only one of the decrees would be incompetent. 5. 1 it is on this central controversy that the present appeal requires to be considered.

( 6 ) IN the first instance, learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that although the present appeal is filed and presented as a singular appeal, it can and should be considered as an appeal from the common judgement, altho