JUDGMENT

Dr. ANAND, J .:- Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 19-9-1989 dismissing appellants Writ Appeal No. 675/82.

3. The first respondent, a private transport operator in the State of Andhra Pradesh who at the material time was operating his stage carriage on the inter-Sate route Chittoor in (Andhra Pradesh) to Salem (in Tamil Nadu), filed Writ Petition No 4343 of 1980 in the High Court of Madras seeking quashing of the scheme of nationalisation approved under Section 68 (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1959 as published in G.O.Ms.No. 579 Home dated 7-4-1975 and for certain other reliefs. The learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding inter alia that the entire scheme as approved, was inconsistent and not capable of implementation and that the writ petitioner (1st respondent herein) was entitled to have his renewal application considered on the said basis. The appellant who had been impleaded as the 3rd respondent in the writ petition, filed Writ Appeal No. 675/82 within the period of limitation. The State of Tamil Nadu, also a respondent in the writ petition, filed a separate writ appeal but beyond 150 days of the period of limitation, along with an application seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. While notice was issued on the writ appeal filed by the appellant, in the writ appeal filed by the State notice was issued in the condone delay application. On 4-3-1986 a Division Bench of the High Court, declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal filed by the State. When the writ appeal filed by the appellant came up for hearing before the Division Bench, the same was dismissed on the sole ground that since the writ appeal filed by the State had already been dismissed by the Division Bench, the writ appeal filed by the appellant was barred by the principle of res judicata and was as such not maintainable, Reliance was placed by the Division Bench upon the Judgment in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1332.

4. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable and the reliance placed by it on Sheodans case (AIR 1966 SC 1332) (supra) is misplaced.

5. In Sheodans case (AIR 1966 SC 1332) (supra) the facts were entirely different. In that case the Trial Court had decided common issue relating to title which was a common issue in four different suits. Four separate decrees had been prepared. Two of the appeals, arising out of two suits, were dismissed on a preliminary ground with the result that the decrees in those two suits became final. In the two appeals filed subsequently, the earlier order dismissing the two appeals was held to operate as res judicata and the two subsequent appeals were accordingly dismissed.

6. In the present case the factual and legal situation is entirely different. The State as well as the appellant were respondents in one and the same writ petition, against the decision of which they had filed separate appeals. The dismissal of the writ appeal filed by the State on the ground of delay not being condoned could not in law affect the maintainability of the writ appeal which had been filed by the appellant within time and was pending final hearing in the High Court. The order in the writ petition could have been challenged by one appeal only unlike in Sheodan Singhs case where four appeals were required to be filed in law against the four decrees even though deciding the common issue relating to title. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view of the High Court that the dismissal of States appeal, in the facts and circumstances of the case could operate as res judicata and bar the maintainability of the appeal filed by the appellant.

7. In Narhari v. Shanker, AIR 1953 SC 419, on the suit of the plaintiff being decreed in the Trial Court, two separate appeals were taken by two set of defendants. The Appellate Court allowed both the appeals and dismissed the plaintiffs sui