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Gujarat High Court
Judgename :Akil Kureshi
SOMABHAI BHAGWANBHAI GOHIL - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT - Respondent
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION 17080 of 2004
Decided On : 12/01/2005
Sarpanch - Suspension - Involvement in offences of moral turpitude - Finding as to - Sustainability.
Head Note :
Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 - Section 59(1) - [Indian] Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of 1860) - Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 504 and 506 - Bombay Police Act - Section 135 - Sarpanch - Suspension - Involvement in offences of moral turpitude - Finding as to - Sustainability - District Development Officer (DDO) suspended petitioner from the position of Sarpanch holding that petitioner is involved in a criminal case of offences involving moral turpitude - The impugned order of DDO was upheld by Additional Development Commissioner without adverting to the aspect whether the allegations involve offences of moral turpitude - The allegations against the petitioner in the Criminal Complaint are of having entered into some fight with some residents of village - There is no element of unethical behaviour of dishonest or immoral acts - The charges levelled against petitioner under Sections 324, 323, 504 and 506 even if proved would not amount to conduct as inherently base, vile or deprived - Mere on account of involvement in alleged offences and filing of complaint was, therefore, not sufficient to suspend the petitioner - Court accordingly quashed and set aside impugned orders.
Held :
Court finds that neither the District Development Officer nor the Additional Development Commissioner has adverted to the aspect whether the allegations made against the petitioner would amount to offences involving moral turpitude. Mechanically both the authorities came to the conclusion that the petitioner is involved in offences involving moral turpitude. Mere involvement in offence punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code ipso facto would not constitute offence involve moral turpitude. Without there being anything additional in the complaint per se such offence cannot be categorised as one involving moral turpitude. In that view of the matter it would be necessary for the authorities to examine the nature of allegations made before concluding whether the offences are such involving moral turpitude. In the present case the allegations against the petitioner are of having entered into some fight with some of the residents of the village. There is no element of unethical behaviour of dishonest or immortal acts. Charges even if proved, would not amount to conduct which can be described as inherently base, vile or depraved. Having thus examined the allegations made against the petitioner in the complaint, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that he is involved in offences involving moral turpitude. Mere filing of the complaint was therefore, not sufficient to suspend the petitioner. [Para 9]
Law Laid Down :
Mere involvement in offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506, IPC ipso facto would not constitute offence involving moral turpitude.
Cases Law Analysis :
Narabhai Veljibhai Chaudhary vs. R.S. Vaghela & Ors. 1997 (1) GLR 599 [Para 3.1];; Bikhumiya Sarfumiya Malek vs. District Development Officer, Mehsana, 1999 (3) GLR 2693 [Para 3.2];; Thakorbhai Bhagabhai vs. D.D.O., Surat & Anr., 1980 GLR 966 [Para 3.3];; Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 3300 [Para 3.4].-Relied on
Abhuji Karshaji Thakore vs. Thakore Jitaben Manchaji passed on 05.05.2003 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 179 of 2003 in Special Civil Application No. 516 of 2003 with Civil Application No. 1221 of 2003 [Para 5.1].-Distinguished
Held :
Court finds that neither the District Development Officer nor the Additional Development Commissioner has adverted to the aspect whether the allegations made against the petitioner would amount to offences involving moral turpitude. Mechanically both the authorities came to the conclusion that the petitioner is involved in offences involving moral turpitude. Mere involvement in offence punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code ipso facto would not constitute offence involve moral turpitude. Without there being anything additional in the complaint per se such offence cannot be categorised as one involving moral turpitude. In that view of the matter it would be necessary for the authorities to examine the nature of allegations made before concluding whether the offences are such involving moral turpitude. In the present case the allegations against the petitioner are of having entered into some fight with some of the residents of the village. There is no element of unethical behaviour of dishonest or immortal acts. Charges even if proved, would not amount to conduct which can be described as inherently base, vile or depraved. Having thus examined the allegations made against the petitioner in the complaint, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that he is involved in offences involving moral turpitude. Mere filing of the complaint was therefore, not sufficient to suspend the petitioner. [Para 9]
Law Laid Down :
Mere involvement in offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506, IPC ipso facto would not constitute offence involving moral turpitude.
Cases Law Analysis :
Narabhai Veljibhai Chaudhary vs. R.S. Vaghela & Ors. 1997 (1) GLR 599 [Para 3.1];; Bikhumiya Sarfumiya Malek vs. District Development Officer, Mehsana, 1999 (3) GLR 2693 [Para 3.2];; Thakorbhai Bhagabhai vs. D.D.O., Surat & Anr., 1980 GLR 966 [Para 3.3];; Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 3300 [Para 3.4].-Relied on
Abhuji Karshaji Thakore vs. Thakore Jitaben Manchaji passed on 05.05.2003 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 179 of 2003 in Special Civil Application No. 516 of 2003 with Civil Application No. 1221 of 2003 [Para 5.1].-Distinguished
( 2 ) FEW facts leading to the present petition can be noted at this stage. (1) The petitioner was elected as a Sarpanch of Dethan Gram Panchayat, election for which took place in March, 2003. A criminal complaint came to be lodged against the petitioner and some other persons on 18/3/2003 involving offences punishable u/s 143, 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code as well as Section 135 of Bombay Police Act. (2)From the complaint which is produced on record, it can be seen that broad allegations made in the complaint are that the petitioner and some other persons had gone to the residence of the complainant in the evening on 18/3/2003 and had picked up a quarrel about tying of cattles in the panchayat land and in the ensuing fight they had beaten up complainant and some other persons with stick and pipe and had used foul language saying that these persons had not supported the petitioner in the election to the post of Sarpanch. It may be noted that in the complaint there is no specific allegation against the petitioner of having given a blow to anyone either with the stick or pipe or even otherwise. (3) On account of filing the said criminal complaint against the petitioner a show cause notice dated 17/4/2003 came to be issued by the District Development Officer why he should not be suspended from the position of Sarpanch. In the show cause notice it was indicated that the petitioner is involved in offences involving moral turpitude. He was, therefore, asked to make a representation within a period of 10 days why he should not be suspended in exercise of powers u/s 59 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (herein after referred to as the said Act.) (4) The petitioner replied to the show cause notice vide his representation dated 2/5/2003. It was indicated that the complaint has been filed on account of political rivalry and that he has not committed any offence. In any case allegations contained in the complaint would not amount to offences involving moral turpitude. (5)District Development Officer however passed impugned order dated 8/10/2004 suspending petitioner from the position of Sarpanch holding that the petitioner is involved in a criminal case of offences involving moral turpitude. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the order passed by the District Development Officer and his appeal came to be rejected by the Additional Development Commissioner on 29/11/2004. (6)The petitioner has challenged the above mentioned orders passed by the authorities below by which he was suspended as a Sarpanch.
( 3 ) LEARNED advocate Shri Rathod appearing for the petitioner submitted that the orders under challenge are required to be quashed and set aside. He contended that the petitioner is falsely involved in the criminal case by his political rivals and that he has not committed any offence. He contended that in any case the allegations made against the petitioner, even if taken on the face value, would not constitute offence involving moral turpitude. He further pointed out that the Additional Development Commissioner in case of the present petitioner has held that the allegations amount to offences involving moral turpitude whereas under identical circumstances very same authority while allowing appeal filed by another Sarpanch by order dated 26/6/2003 found that such allegations would not constitute offences involving moral turpitude. It was contended that respondent no. 3 herein who i
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