2006 Supreme(Guj) 247

2006 (2) GCD 1720 (Guj) (DB)
Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.M. Panchal &
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bankim N. Mehta
Benaben Bhanabhai & Ors.
Versus
Union of India & Ors.
Special Civil Application No. 6378 of 1990
Decided on 10/04/2006

Point in Issue :
Award — Notice served — Application to make reference — Refusal — Ground of limitation — Finding as to — Sustainability.

Headnote:Head Note :

       (a) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) — Sections 4, 5-A(2), 6, 9, 11, 12(2), 18, 18(1), 18(2), 18(2)(a) and (b) — Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) — Sections 5 and 29 and Article 100 — Award — Notice served — Application to make reference — Refusal — Ground of limitation — Finding as to — Sustainability — Award was made in the case by Land Acquisition Officer on 30.08.1986 and notice of award dated 10.10.1986 was served on petitioners — The application requiring the Special Land Acquisition Officer to make reference to the Court was filed on 06.02.1990 i.e., not within six weeks of the receipt of the notice as required under Section 18(2)(b) of the Act — Provisions of limitation providing condonation of delay has no application in the case because award is made under the Act of 1894 under executive power of competent officer and not by a Court — Therefore, in view of the settled legal position the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not commit any error in refusing to refer the matter to the Court for determination of appropriate amount of compensation payable to petitioners because application was time barred and he had no power to condone the delay.

       Held :

       It is an admitted position that the award in this case was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 20.08.1986. In Paragraph 4 of the petition, the petitioners have admitted that the notice dated 10.10.1986 issued under Section 12 (2) of the Act was served on them. The application under Section 18 (1) of the Act, requiring the Special Land Acquisition Officer, to make reference to the Court was filed on 06.02.1990 i.e., not within six weeks of the receipt of the notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act as required by Clause (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the settled legal position the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not commit any error in refusing to refer the matter to the Court for determination of appropriate compensation payable to the petitioners because the application was time barred and he had no power to condone the delay. Therefore, the first prayer made by the petitioners is liable to be refused and is hereby refused. [Para 14]

       Head Note :

       (b) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) — Section 18(2) — Prescribing period of limitation — Constitutional validity — Finding of — Statutes of Limitation and prescription are statutes of peace and repose — Rule of vigilance which is foundation of statute of limitation rests on principles of public policy — The limitation for institution of a legal action is a limitation on the availability of a legal remedy during a certain period of time — The object of legal remedy is to repair a damage caused by reason of a legal injury suffered by the suitor — The period of limitation fixes the life span of a legal remedy for the redress of wrong — Viewed in light of these principles the limitation prescribed by Section 18(2) of the Act can hardly be regarded as violative of fundamental rights guaranteed to claimant under constitution because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by statute — Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 19 (1)(f), 21 and 300-A.

       Held :

       One of the considerations on which the doctrine of limitation and prescription is based upon is that there is presumption that a right not exercised for a long time is not existent. The object of the law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by party’s own inaction, negligence or latches. The object of law of limitation is in accordance with the maxim “Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litum” i.e., the interest of the State requires that there should be an end to litigation. Statutes of limitation and prescription are statutes of peace and repose. Rule of vigilance which is foundation of statute of limitation rests on principles of public policy. The purpose of limitation is to induce the claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. The limitation for institution of a legal action is a limitation on the availability of a legal remedy during a certain period of time. Different periods are prescribed for various remedies. The idea is that every legal action must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The object of legal remedy is to repair a damage caused by reason of a legal injury suffered by the suitor. The period of limitation fixes the life span of a legal remedy for the redress of legal remedy. Viewed in light of these principles, the limitation prescribed by Section 18 (2) of the Act can hardly be regarded as violative of fundamental rights guaranteed to the claimants under Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. [Para 19]

       Head Note :

       (c) Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) — Section 100 — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) — Section 18(2) — Prescribing shorter period of limitation — Constitutional validity — Finding of — A provision of the Act providing for a shorter period of limitation cannot be declared to be unconstitutional simply because in some of the statutes a longer period of limitation has been prescribed for redressal of the litigants grievances — The legislation is enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose — It need not be all embracing — It is for the legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as these covered by legislature are left out would not render the legislation of any law being discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under constitution — Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 19(1)(g).

       Held :

       A provision of the Act providing for a shorter period of limitation cannot be declared to be unconstitutional simply because in some of the Statutes a longer period of limitation has been prescribed for the redressal of the litigants grievances. The legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those covered by the Legislature are left out would not render the legislation of any law being discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. [Para 23]

       This Court is of the opinion that merely because shorter period than one prescribed under Article 100 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is prescribed under Section 18 (2) of the Act, the provisions of Section 18 (2) of the Act cannot be regarded as violative of the provisions enshrined under Article 14, 19 (1) (f) and 300-A of the Constitution. [Para 24]

       Law Laid Down :

       Merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those covered by the legislature are left out would not render the legislation discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights.

       Case Law Analysis :

       Memon Ibrahim Haji Latif Sukhediwala vs. Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr., 1994 (1) GLR 296 [Para 7];; Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal, 1996 (9) SCC 414 [Para 7];; Mahadeo Bajirao Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, 2006 (1) GLH 583 [Para 13];; V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. vs. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao & Anr., 2005 (4) SCC 613 [Para 21].—Relied on

       Appearance :

       Ms. Vasuben P Shah, for the Petitioner (s): 1-11.

       Shrved by RPAD (R), for the Respondent (s): 1.

       Rule Served, for the Respondent (s): 2.

       Government Pleader, for the Respondent (s): 3.

       Conclusion :

       In view of the settled legal position the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not commit error in refusing to refer the matter to Court for determination of appropriate compensation because application was time barred and he had no power to condone the delay.

       Decided in Favour of :

       Respondent

       Petition Dismissed