JAYANT PATEL, J. The petitioner by this petition is seeking appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the order dated 11.11.2009 passed by the DRAT, Mumbai, whereby it has been held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'Securitisation Act') and therefore, the Tribunal which had earlier rejected the application for condonation of delay is directed to consider the matter in light of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 17 of the Securitisation Act.

2. Heard Mr. Khare for Mr. Sankhla for the petitioner and Mr. Shukla with Mr. Jani for the respondent No.3 by caveat.

3. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') is not a Court and as the Limitation Act applies to the Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal, therefore, DRAT has committed error apparent on the face of record in taking view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act before the Tribunal, therefore, this Court may interfere.

4. Whereas the learned counsel appearing by caveat for the respondents supported the order passed by DRAT and further contended that High Court of Bombay as well as Madras High Court has taken the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, therefore, the view taken by the DRAT does not deserve to be interfered with.

5. It is undisputed position that DRT while exercising the power under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, is a Tribunal and not the Court. But the question does not rest there merely because it is not a Court so far as applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. Section 5 of the Limitation Act for ready reference reads as under :

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases -Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation :- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Section.”

6. In order to examine the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reference to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would be relevant, which reads as under :

“(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any sit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 5 to 24 (inclusive shall apply only in so far, as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

7. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, it appears that if there is express provision made under special law or in local law, prescribing the limitation for any suit or appeal or application, such shall apply for prescription of such period. However, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the extent unless they are expressly excluded by such special law. To say in other words, if the Limitation Act provides for a particular period during which the application has to be made to any Tr