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2013 Supreme(Guj) 137

HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Jayant Patel, J.
SHANTILAL MOHANLAL SHAH & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
Special Civil Application No. 3184 of 2004
Decided on: 12-4-2013

Advocates appeared:
Dhawan M. Jayswal, A.G.P., for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3.

Headnote:

Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 – Sections 2(21), 3(35) – Bombay General Clause Act – 21(1)(2) – Present petition is directed against the order passed by the Tribunal, whereby Tribunal has set aside the order passed by Deputy Collector and the earlier order of the Mamlatdar for permitting one unit has been confirmed – Held, Court held that petitioners had formed partnership firm and purchase the land - Not only that but partnership firm had filed the form through partners – Partnership firm is a Joint Venture by all partners of the firm with an object to even profit or gain – Liabilities of partners is inter se, inter linked and inter connected – It could be termed as a body of individuals or an association of persons, even if not incorporated to be included in the definition of a person – Therefore, view taken by Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous – Court, therefore, refused to interfere and upheld the decision of Tribunal – Petition Dismissed

Judgment

JAYANT PATEL, J.

The present petition is directed against the order passed by the Tribunal dated 5-3-2003, whereby the Tribunal has set aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector and the earlier order of the Mamlatdar for permitting one unit has been confirmed.

2. The short facts of the case are that one B. Shantilal & Company was holding agricultural land at Village Chiklota, Taluka Valiya. The form was filed by the partner of the said firm on behalf of the firm under Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The form was processed, and ultimately, vide order dated 18-4-1983, Mamlatdar & A.L.T. declared that the land admeasuring 56 acres and 30 gunthas as surplus land under Sec. 21(1), (2) of the Act. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the matter was carried in appeal before the Deputy Collector being Appeal No. 10 of 1984 and the said appeal came to be rejected by the Deputy Collector vide order dated 13-8-1984. The matter was further carried in revision before the Tribunal being B.A. Nos. 1329 and 1534 of 1984 and both the appeals vide common judgment dated 27-6-1988 were decided by the Tribunal and the matter was remanded to the Mamlatdar and A.L.T. Thereafter, the Mamlatdar and A.L.T. issued notices, heard the parties and declared the land admeasuring 56 acres and 30 gunthas as surplus land. The matter was carried in appeal before the Deputy Collector, Rajpipla and the Deputy Collector, Rajpipla, vide order dated 17-7-1989 confirmed the order of the Mamlatdar. The matter was further carried in revision before the Tribunal being Revision B.A. No. 710 of 1989 and the Tribunal vide order dated 28-6-1993 quashed the order of the Deputy Collector and Mamlatdar and remand the matter to the Mamlatdar and A.L.T. The Mamlatdar and A.L.T. again tried the matter and vide order dated 30th September, 1993 he withdrew the notices under the Act. The matter was taken up in revision by the Deputy Collector against the order of the Mamlatdar being Revision Application No. 1/93-94 and the Deputy Collector confirmed the order of the Mamlatdar. The matter was further carried in revision by the Government before the Tribunal being Revision Application No. 884 of 1994. The Tribunal vide order dated 5-3-2003 set aside the order of the Deputy Collector and restored the first order of the Mamlatdar dated 18-4-1983, whereby the land admeasuring 56 acres 30 gunthas was declared as the surplus land. It is under these circumstances, the petitioners have approached this Court by the present petition.

3. We have heard Mr. Yadav, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Jayswal, learned A.G.P. for the respondents.

4. It appears from the order passed by the Tribunal that the Tribunal has mainly relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Pntent Appeal No. 123 of 2000 dated 4-3-2003 for the purpose of considering the definition of person as provided under Sec. 2(21) of the Act read with Sec. 3(35) of the Bombay General Clauses Act. The Tribunal has reproduced the relevant portion of the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court, relevant of which is at Paragraph 9 reads as under :

"9. This question can be examined with reference to the provisions of Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 also. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1904 defines certain words and phrases. The opening' words of the said Section are very important. As per the opening words, the definition of words given in Sec. 3 of the said Act would be applicable to the words used in the said Act and in all Bombay Acts or Gujarat Acts made after the commencement of the Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Section 3, sub-sec. (35) of the General Clauses Act provides that "person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. It is not in dispute that the Ceiling Act has been enacted after the commencement of Bombay




























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