Jayant M. Patel, J.

1. As all the applications with the main respective appeals and interim applications therein are connected with each other and common questions are to be considered, they are being considered simultaneously. Civil Application No. 11103 of 2015 to 11125 of 2015 are for condonation of delay of 350 days for preferring LPAs against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the respective petitions.

2. We have heard Mr. Pandya, learned Counsel appearing for the applicant-appellant on the application for condonation of delay as well as on merits of the main LPAs.

3. If the explanation, as stated in the applications for condonation of delay, is considered as it is, by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the delay is sufficiently explained. The ground sought to be canvassed is that since Full Bench of this Court had initially taken the view that the LPA would not be maintainable against the order passed by the learned Single Judge arising from the award of the Labour Court, the LPAs were not preferred. Thereafter, as the Apex Court has reversed the order of the Full Bench and remanded the matter to this Court, the applicant - appellant has decided to prefer appeals.

4. In our view, such can hardly be said as sufficient cause for not preferring appeals within the prescribed period of limitation.

5. At this stage, we may record that it is by now well settled that when the delay is for a shorter period, Court may take a lenient view, but if the delay is for a longer period, the Court may take a strict view of the matter. The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 and more particularly the observations made at paragraphs 14 to 16 as under:--

"14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate-Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106. (Emphasis supplied)

16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, State of U.P. v.