J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:

“7A. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to admit and allow the present petition.

B. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 16.11.2017 passed by the Ld. 4th Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Limdi in Criminal Revision Application No. 26 of 2017 as well as the order dated 05.10.2017 passed by the Ld. A.C.J.M. Limdi in Cr. M.A. No. 21/2017 in the interest of justice.

C. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue direction to handover the interim possession of the mudammal Ashok Leyland Truck (Dumper) bearing registration No. GJ-23-Y-6766 to the petitioner herein, in the interest of justice.

D. To pass any other and further orders as may be deemed, fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

2. It appears from the materials on record that the applicant herein is the registered owner of a ASHOK LEYLAND TRUCK (Dumper) bearing registration No. GJ-23-Y-6766. This truck came to be seized in connection with a mining case registered at the Limdi Police Station, District Surendranagar vide IC. R. No. 76 of 2017 for the offence punishable under Sections 379 read with 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4(1) and 4(1)(A) and 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act and Rules 3, 5, 8, 13 and 17 of the Gujarat Mines (Prevention of Illegal Mining Transportation and Storage) Rules.

3. As the vehicle in question came to be seized by the police in connection with the F.I.R. referred to above, the applicant being the registered owner, preferred an application under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the interim release. The Magistrate rejected the application. Thereafter, the applicant herein filed a revision application before the Sessions Court. The revision application also came to be rejected.

4. Being dissatisfied with the orders passed by the Courts below, the applicant has come up with this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Courts below committed any error in passing the impugned orders.

6. The issue raised in this application is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Bapalalsinh Dolatsinh Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat, Special Criminal Application No. 8892 of 2017 decided on 24th November 2017. The decision in the case of Bapalalsinh Dolatsinh Jadeja (supra) is also in connection with the very same F.I.R. which is the subject-matter of the present application. I may quote the relevant observations made by this Court in the said judgment as under:

“8. It appears from the order passed by the Revisional Court that it relied on one decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Narender in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 2014 decided on 06.01.2014. The judgment of the Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009, more particularly, Sections 33, 58 and 61. I have gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court will have no application worth the name so far as the case in hand is concerned.

9. The decision of the Supreme Court is based on Sections 59(1) and 61 of the Delhi Excise Act. Section 61 of the Delhi Excise Act reads as under:

“61. Bar of jurisdiction in confiscation. Whenever any intoxicant, material, still, utensil, implement, apparatus or any receptacle, package, vessel, animal, cart, or other conveyance used in committing any offence, is seized or detained under this Act, no court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to make any order with regard to such property.”

10. Thus, Section 61 of the Delhi Excise Act makes it very clear that not