Point of Law:
At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to Government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. In as much as, the notice was issued as late as on 31st December, 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed.

ORDER :

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act is at the instance of the original private respondents of a writ application filed by the respondent No.5 herein and is directed against the judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 04.02.2020 in the Special Civil Application No.6148 of 2018 by which the learned Single Judge allowed the writ application filed by the respondent No.5 herein (original writ applicant).

2. We have heard Ms.Nisha Parikh, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, the learned AGP for the respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 respectively.

3. The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ application filed by the respondent No.5 herein observed as under :

“12. To the contrary, the Tribunal, without examining the aspects of delay of 53 years, has set aside the order of the Deputy Collector on the ground that there was no power vested with Extra Aval clerk to pass such orders and the Mamlatdar cannot direct the Extra Aval Clerk to pass such order.

13. In the considered opinion of this Court, such observation made by the Tribunal are arbitrary and illegal. Since the proceedings reveal that the Mamlatdar had only directed the Extra Aval Clerk to do the needful, after the Mamlatdar had passed the order and he had forwarded his opinion to the concerned authorities.

14. Be that as it may, the GRT has travelled beyond its powers in entertaining the dispute after a passage of more than 50 years, at the behest of the private respondents, who have remained dormant over their rights. The predecessor of the present respondents during his lifetime has never raised any objections before the concerned authorities and hence, the present petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the GRT in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/233 of 2014 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute.”

4. In our opinion, no error much less an error of law could be said to have been committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned judgment and order warranting any interference of the present appeal. The Deputy Collector declined to interfere having regard to the delay of 53 years. We fail to understand on what basis the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal could be said to be justified in interfering after 53 years.

5. The power of the Tribunal under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, are circumscribed. Section 76 of the Act reads thus :

“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939, [1] an application for revision may be made to the [2] [Gujarat Revenue Tribunal] constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector on the following grounds only-

(a) the order of the Collector was contrary to law;

(b) the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law; or

(c) there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act, which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice.”

6. The scope and power of revision under Section 76 of the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Baldevji vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1327, wherein it was held that the powers of revision entrusted to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, are practically identical with the second appellate powers of the High Court under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code before it was amended by Act 104 of 1976. The scope and ambit of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not mere res integra. As observed by the Supreme Court in Ramachandra vs. Ramalingam, reported in AIR 1962 SC 302, the exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to cases where the High Court is satisfied that the decision is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law, or that the decision has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having th