The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Stamp Act, 1971, and the Partnership Act, 1932, is crucial in determining the applicability of stamp duty on a deed of assignment, and the nature of the transaction as a 'transfer' or retirement within the partnership framework.

JUDGMENT :

Vineet Kothari, J.

1. The State of Gujarat has filed pre Letters Patent Appeal against the Judgment and Order dated 18.10.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: A.J. Desai, J.), allowing the writ petition filed by the Respondent - M/s. Tulsi Rice and Pulse Mills v. Collector of Stamp and holding that on the Document in question which was described as Deed of Assignment dated 5.8.2000, the stamp duty could not be demanded by the Stamp Authorities in view of the Full Bench Decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Velo Industries v. Collector, Bhavnagar : 1971 ITR 291). Mr. K.M. Antani, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the Appellate - State submitted that the Document dated 5.8.2000 clearly spelled that one of the seven partners - Dharmendrasing Dajibhai Gohil assigned his interest in the leasehold land leased for 99 years by GIDC to the Partnership Firm - M/s. Tulsi Puce and Pulse Mills in favour of the continuing six partners and therefore, the assignment amounted to 'transfer' as defined in the Stamp Law and the Stamp Authority was justified in levying the stamp duty vide order dated 16.4.2008.

2. The said order dated 16.4.2008 was earlier set aside in the writ petition filed by the Petitioner by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 25057 of 2006 - Tulsi Rice and Pulse Mills v. Deputy Collector, decided on 22.11.2007 and the said Deputy Collector was directed to decide the case afresh, upon which again the said Authority decided on 31.7.2009 again levying the stamp duty on the said Partnership Firm, aggrieved by which the said Partnership Firm again approached this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 360 of 2010 which came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge by the order impugned before us dated 18.10.2016, following the Full Bench Decision of this Court in the case of Velo Industries (supra).

3. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thayyil Mammo and Anr. v. Kottiath Ramunni and Ors. : AIR 1966 SC 337), more particularly in para 9 of the said judgment, wherein the judgment of Maclean, C.J. in the case of Hemendra Nath Mukerji v. Kumar Nath Roy: (1908) 12 Cal WN 478) is referred, wherein the said English Judge held that where by a registered deed called a Deed of Disclaimer the executants relinquished all their right, title and interest and claim in the properties in favour of the releasee upon the condition that the releasee would discharge certain debts and the executants would be under no liability to pay those debts, it was observed that though the deed was stamped only as a release and not with ad valorem stamp, Lord Maclean, C.J. held that on its true construction, it was a transfer. This reliance placed by learned Assistant Government Pleader, with great respect, is misplaced as we will discuss the same here in below.

4. Per contra, Mr. D.J. Bhatt, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted and relied upon the Full Bench Decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Velo Industries (supra), in which the Full Bench of this Court held as under:

"4. The charging section in the Act is section 3 which provides, inter alia, that, subject to the provisions of the Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, every instrument mentioned in that Schedule, which is executed in the State on or after the date of the commencement of the Act, shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that Schedule as the proper duty for the instrument. Article 25 of Schedule I prescribes the amount of duty for "conveyance". It consists of two clauses : (a) and (b). It is not material for our purpose to notice the difference between the two classes since the common requirement in both clauses is that the instrument must be a conveyance and the only question before us is whether the instrument in the present case could be said to be a conveyance. Now, c