JUDGMENT :

1. Rule returnable forthwith. With the consent of the learned advocate for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:

“13(A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction and be pleased to order to quash and set aside the impugned resolution, Annexure-D, dated 26.07.2019 by declaring the same as illegal, null and void.”

2. Facts in brief are as under:

2.1 The petitioner was an elected Sarpanch of Chuda Gram Panchayat. Chuda Gram Panchayat consisted of 19 elected members. It is the case of the petitioner that 10 elected members moved a Motion of No Confidence against the petitioner on 03.07.2019. The Motion of No Confidence was put to vote and in the aforesaid meeting 13 members voted in favour of the No Confidence Motion whereas 06 voted against motion.

2.2 The Motion of No Confidence was passed as prescribed under Section 56 by 2/3rd majority, and therefore, the petitioner was removed by virtue of the No Confidence Motion and that is the subject matter of challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. Mr.Pankaj Champaneri, learned advocate for the petitioner, has made the following submissions:

3.1 Mr.Champaneri, learned advocate, would assail the resolution of No Confidence passed by the Panchayat on the ground that in accordance with Section 56(3) of the Gujarat Panchayats’ Act, the petitioner was not offerred the right to speak as envisaged under Sub section 3 of Section 56 of the Act.

3.2 Mr.Champaneri, learned advocate, would further submit that since Sub-section 3 begins with “Notwithstanding”, it is an additional procedure which has to be followed in addition to the proceeding of Section 56 of the Act. He would rely on the rules, namely, The Gujarat Panchayat Procedure Rules, 1997, and submit that while reading the proceedings in question (page 24) what has been followed is the ordinary procedure and the procedure itself suggests that the ordinary procedure has been followed.

3.3 Further, the resolution has been passed directly without following the Special Procedure envisaged under Sub-section 3 of Section 56 of the Act which is a mandatory provision and merely because an affidavit-in-reply states that he did not ask for an opportunity to speak would not satisfy the compliance of “Right to Speak” as this is mandatory procedure of which there has to be compliance.

3.4 Mr.Pankaj Champaneri, learned advocate, relied on the decisions of this Court in the case of Geetaben Bharatbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2006 (1) GLH 91. He also relied on a decision in the case of Suvarnaben Chetanbhai Raval vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2014 (3) GLR 4277., to submit that the Right to Speak is a mandatory provision, and therefore, when the petitioner was not given the Right to Speak, the Motion of No Confidence must be set aside.

4. Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 would submit that the contention of Mr.Champaneri, that the mandatory provision of Right to Speak under Section 56(3) of the Act has been violated is misconceived. Relying on the Minutes of the Meeting and the affidavit-in-reply filed, Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate, would submit that during the process of the meeting when No Confidence Motion was put to vote, 13 members have supported the same while the petitioner and 05 other members voted against it.

4.1 Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate, would submit that the petitioner did not ask for an opportunity to address the House. The proceedings of the meeting are videographed and it is available. Copy of the Minutes of the Meeting are annexed to the affidavit-in-reply and therefore, he would submit that the statutory mandate of Section 56(3) was not violated.

4.2 Mr.H.S.Munshaw, learned counsel for the r