JUDGMENT :

BIREN VAISHNAV, J.

1. Heard Mr. Jal Unwala, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Anup S. Bhavsar, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Kurven Desai, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents through Video Conferencing.

2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the challenge is to the order dated 21.1.2019 passed by the respondent No. 2 by which the services of the petitioner who was working as Sub Registrar, Grade-II Class-III have been terminated. The petitioner was appointed on Fixed Term Basis by an order dated 17.12.2013. On an allegation that the petitioner had demanded Rs. 2,50,000/- from one Rajendrasinh Babusinh Chauhan, an FIR came to be lodged being FIR No. 15 of 2018 with the ACB police station, Gandhinagar under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Based on this FIR, the order of termination has been passed.

3. Mr. Jal Unwala, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the issue is covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 1596 of 2019 dated 24.7.2020 which has been followed by this Court in SCA No. 22618 of 2019. Relevant paragraph Nos. 5 to 18 of LPA No. 1596/2019 dated 24.7.2020 are reproduced hereunder:

"5. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the submissions made by them and in view of analysis of relevant record, we have found that the order passed by the learned Single Judge appears to be exhaustive dealing with not only the status of the present respondents and whether the order passed against them is a stigmatic or not. The reasons reflecting from Para. 5 onwards are based upon analysis of the relevant decisions in the context of present background of facts. Hence, we deem it proper to reproduce the same hereby:

"5. The question arises is whether the order was punitive and amounted to stigma which ought to have preceded by a regular inquiry against the petitioner in respect of the allegations levelled against the petitioner employee even though petitioner was appointed for a fixed term of five years.

5.1 In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [(2000) 5 SCC 152], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under:

"Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry." (para 29 (emphasis supplied)

5.2 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [(1980) 2 SCC 593] stated and observed thus,

"53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive favour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a