IMPORTANT POINT
The delay in passing a detention order and the lack of a live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention render the detention order invalid. Mere registration of FIRs cannot be the sole basis for invoking power under the Act.

JUDGMENT :

SAMIR J. DAVE, J.

1. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties.

2. The present petition is directed against order of detention dated 30.09.2023 passed by the respondent – detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) by detaining the petitioner – detenue as defined under section 2(c) of the Act.

3. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of registration of the two offence under Sections 324 and 307 of the IPC and 135 of the Gujarat Police Act by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(c) of the Act. Further, learned advocate for the detenue submits that illegal activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the most, it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of the detenue with respect to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life of people at large or that on the basis of criminal cases, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order.

4. Learned Advocate has thereafter submitted that if the first offence registered against the petitioner is considered, if the last offence is considered, then from the date of his release, period of 2.5 months has passed after detention order is passed and hence, the delay is fatal to the detention order.

5. Learned advocate has raised the other grounds for quashment of detention order, but in view of a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal [AIR 1970 SC 852], even though the one ground is fake and the other grounds are not fake, the detention order has to be stroked out as not passed in accordance with law.

6. Learned AGP for the respondent State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue indicate that detenue is in habit of indulging into the activity as defined under section 2(c) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court.

7. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any baring on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person within the meaning of section 2(c) of the