The court ruled that the petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for condoning a significant delay in challenging a Trust property order, affirming the lower court's decision.

JUDGMENT :

1. RULE. Ms. Hetal Patel, learned AGP waives service of rule for the respondents.

2. The present Special Civil Application impugns the order dated 31.12.2024 passed below Exh.14 in Civil Misc. Application (Delay) No.10 of 2023 passed by the learned 3^rd Additional District Judge, Visavadar whereby the delay condonation application of the petitioners has been dismissed.

3. The brief facts of the petitioners case are that, the petitioner No.1’s grandfather was Garasdar of Mangnath, Pipli village. As per the order dated 16.10.1951 passed by the Mamlatdar, the subject land had been given to the petitioner No.1’s grandfather for cultivation as per the provisions of Barkhali (Abolition) Act, 1951. That the said land came to be included as a land of the Trust at the time of its registration. That the land was mistakenly included as Trust property. That thereafter the petitioner No.1’s Guru had filed Application No.58 of 2000 under Section 22A of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 before the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner to remove the subject land from the list of property of the Trust as it was included by mistake. That vide order dated 02.06.2000, the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner allowed the application No.58 of 2000 by reasoned order excluding the subject land from the list of the properties of the Trust. That thereafter the original applicant has sold out the land to the petitioner No.2 herein vide registered sale deed No.294 dated 11.07.2000. However, one Bhairavgiri Guru Sohangiri challenged the order dated 02.06.2000 passed by the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner removing the subject property from the list of the Trust by filing Revision Application No.7 of 2001 before the learned Joint Charity Commissioner under Section 70A of the Gujarat Public Trust Act. The original applicant filed objections to the said revision application. That during the pendency of the revision application, the said applicant passed away. Thereafter, the original applicant also passed away. The learned Joint Charity Commissioner vide order dated 23.02.2015 set aside the order of the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner dated 02.06.2000 and ordered the subject land to be again included in the list of the properties of the Trust. That the petitioners were not aware of the order dated 23.02.2015. That in the year 2021, when the petitioner No.2 approached the petitioner No.1 for entering the name of the petitioner No.2 in the revenue record and the petitioners made application for obtaining the revenue record, it was revealed that the subject land was Trust land and therefore, they came to know about the order dated 23.02.2015 in Revision Application No.7 of 2001. That thereafter the petitioners applied for the certified copy of the order dated 23.02.2015 on 05.10.2021 and the same was received on 24.02.2022. That thereafter the petitioners’ advocate received copy of the entire record from the office of the Charity Commissioner on 24.10.2021. Thereafter, the petitioners had preferred appeal under Section 72 of the Gujarat Public Trust Act along with the application for condonation of delay of 6 years, 8 months and 20 days. The appeal came to be filed on 24.04.2022 before the learned Additional District Judge, Visavdar challenging the said order dated 23.02.2015 passed by the learned Joint Charity Commissioner in Revision Application No.7 of 2001. That by the impugned order, the learned Additional District Judge rejected the petitioners’ application for condonation of delay holding that there are no sufficient reasons to condone the delay of 6 years, 8 months and 20 days. The petitioners were also directed to deposit costs of Rs.3,000/-.

Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present Special Civil Application.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned District Court while deciding the application for condonation of delay has erred in coming to the conclusion that sufficient reasons for condonation of d