The main legal point established in the judgment is that the right of appeal is a statutory right and the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged beyond the limited grounds available under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act.

T. NK Singh, J.

1. This revision petition or/application under Article 227 of the Constitution filed by the Insurance Company is directed against the judgment and award dated 24.07.2009 passed in T.S (MAC) 103 of 2008 by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South Tripura, Udaipur.

2. Heard Mr. Mr. K. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the Petitioner-Insurance Company, Mr. R. Datta, Mr. A. Baidya, Mr. B. Bhattacharjee and Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents.

3. Only the facts sufficient for deciding the present revision petition are noted.

The T.S (MAC) 103 of 2008 is filed by the Respondent-claimant for compensation for the motor accident of the vehicle ensured with the Petitioner-Insurance Company. In the said MAC case the Petitioner-Insurance Company has been made one of the Respondents. The Petitioner-Insurance Company has limited grounds of defense as provided under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act in the MAC case. The Petitioner-Insurance Company also contested the said MAC case. From the records it is clear that the Petitioner-Insurance Company has not obtained leave under Section 170 of the M.V. Act to contest the claim of the claimant-Respondent on all or any of the grounds which are available to the persons against whom the claim is made.

Unless the leave as provided under Section 170 of the M.V. Act is obtained by the Appellant-Insurance Company, the Appellant-Insurance Company is entitled to defend the claim of the Respondent-claimant only on the limited grounds mentioned under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. The learned Tribunal after hearing the case of both the parties passed the impugned judgment and award.

4. The impugned judgment and award is an appealable order inasmuch as the aggrieved party is open to file appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act to this Court. The Petitioner-Insurance Company certainly has the right to file appeal against the impugned judgment and award but only on the limited ground available under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act in the absence leave under Section 170 of the M.V. Act.

5. On perusal of the memo of revision petition it is clear that the Petitioner-Insurance Company had taken several grounds over and above the limited grounds available under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act for assailing the impugned judgment and award.

It is so well settled that even the constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what is not permitted to do directly. If there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the constitutional authority from doing any act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by adoption of any subterfuge; and that would be clearly a fraud on the constitutional provision. Ref: Decision of the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 579.

It is also well settled that where power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. Ref: Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 789 (C.B).

Where a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, held, the power has to be exercised only in that manner. Ref: Commr. of I.T., Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Gharwala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 (C.B.) When a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner alone. Ref: Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd : (203) 2 SCC 111.

The Apex Court in Haryana State Industrial Dev Corp. v. Shakuntala, 2009 (13) SCALE 410 held that "where a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in adopting the procedure, deviation to act in a different manner which does not disclose any discernible principles which is reasonable itself shall be labeled as arbitrary."

6. As discussed above, in the present case, the M.V. Act prescribes clear cut proced