I.A. Ansari, J.

1. I have heard Mr. M.H. Rajbarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, and Ms. P.K. Deka, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-defendants.

2. By preferring this appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants have put to challenge the judgment and decree, dated 24.2.2003 and 7.3.2003, respectively passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hailakandi, in Title Appeal No. 20 of 1995, dismissing the appeal and thereby upholding and affirming the judgment and decree, dated 27.6.1995 and 10.7.1995, respectively, whereby the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) had dismissed the suit.

3. The case of the plaintiffs-appellants is, in brief, thus : On the request of the defendant-respondent No. 1, the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants, namely, Sarada Mohan Das, had allowed the defendants to stay in a room on the western varanda of his house as monthly tenant. In the absence of plaintiff and his family members, the defendants trespassed into the main room of the house and when the wife of said Sarada Mohan Das asked the defendants to hand over the possession of the house, the defendants assaulted her, whereupon the said plaintiff lodged a criminal case against the defendants, but, later on, did not pursue the case as the defendant No. 1 executed a deed of compromise stating therein that he would vacate the house within 22.4.1987. However, the defendant No. 1 had failed to do so, the plaintiffs instituted a suit. The said suit gave rise to Title Suit No. 70 of 1987. In the suit, the defendants took the plea that they were in the occupation of the suit premises on the strength of an unregistered lease deed, which was executed between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The suit was dismissed, on 25.3.1988, by the learned Munsiff No. 1, Hailakandi. A decree accordingly followed. The dismissal of the suit was challenged by the said plaintiff by way of an appeal, which gave rise to Title Appeal No. 8 of 1988. The appeal too was dismissed by the judgment and decreed, dated 22.2.1989, passed by Assistant District Judge, Hailakandi. After the dismissal of the appeal, the said plaintiff against instituted the present suit seeking, inter alia, declaration that (i) the lease deed, mentioned in the 3rd Scheduled of the plaint, which was relied upon by the defendants in the former suit, (i.e., Title Suit No. 70 of 1987), was forged, fictitious and illegal and (ii) recovery of khas possession of the 2nd Scheduled land and house standing thereon by vacating the defendants therefrom.

4. As indicated hereinabove, the present suit also failed and was dismissed by the learned trial court and the decree has been upheld by the learned first appellate court.

5. It is in the backdrop of the above facts that this court is, now, required to determine if there is any substantial question of law raised for determination by the appellants in this second appeal.

6. In support of this appeal, what has been submitted, on behalf of the appellants, is' that the issue, in the subsequent suit, is as to whether the unregistered lease deed, which had been relied upon by the defendants in the former suit, is a forged and fictitious one and this was, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, not an issue in the former suit and, hence, the subsequent suit, i.e., the present suit, which gave rise to the present appeal, was not barred by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('the Code'); whereas the learned appellate court has held that the suit is barred by section 11 of the Code.

7. While considering the above submissions made on behalf of the appellants, it needs to be rioted that the issue No. 2, framed in the former suit, read as under :

(2) Whether the defendants are occupiers of the suit house and possesses by virtue of a lease deed or whether the defendant No. 1 is tenant in respect of the schedule house and possessor?

8. From a bare reading of the issue No. 2, it becomes transparent tha