Judgment

SHINGHAL, J.- Respondent Nawab Hussain was a confirmed Sub-Inspector of Police in Uttar Pradesh. An anonymous complaint was made against him and was investigated by Inspector Suraj Singh who submitted his report to the Superintendent of Police on February 25, 1954. Two cases were registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Penal code. They were also investigated by Inspector Suraj Singh, and the respondent was dismissed from service by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police dated December 20, 1954. He filed an appeal, but it was dismissed on April 17, 1956. He then filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations against him and the action taken against him was mala fide. It was dismissed on October 30, 1959. The respondent then filed a suit in the court of Civil Judge, Etah, on January 7, 1960, in which he challenged the order of his dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that he had been appointed by the Inspector General of Police and that the Deputy Inspector General of Police was not competent to dismiss him by virtue of the provisions of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. The State of Uttar Pradesh traversed the claim in the suit on several grounds, including the plea that the suit was barred by res judicate as "all the matters in issue in this case had been raised or ought to have been raised both in the writ petition and special appeal". The trial Court dismissed the suit on July 21, 1960, mainly on the ground that the Deputy Inspector General of Police would be deemed to be the plaintiffs appointing authority. It however held that the suit was not barred by the principle of res judicata. The District Judge upheld the trial Courts judgment and dismissed the appeal on February 15, 1963. The respondent preferred a second appeal which has been allowed by the impugned judgment of the High Court dated March 27, 1968, and the suit has been decreed. The appellant State of Uttar Pradesh has therefore come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

2. The High Court has taken the view that the suit was not barred by the principle of constructive res judicata and that the respondent could not be dismissed by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police as he had been appointed by the Inspector General of Police. As we have reached the conclusion that the High Court committed an error of law in deciding the objection regarding the bar of res judicata, it will not be necessary for us to examine the other point.

3. The principle of estoppel per res judicata is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council, (1939) 2 KB 426 at p. 437 it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) The finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of community as a matter of public policy and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This