The main legal point established in the judgment is that the right of appeal is a statutory right and the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged beyond the limited grounds available under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act. The court also clarified that the revisional power is circumscribed and limited under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice T. NK Singh

1. Heard Mr. K. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant-Insurance Company, Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, Mr. S. Jiten, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 as well as Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 respectively.

2. This Revision Petition, under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is directed against the judgment and award dated 08.09.2005 which is an appealable one. It is surprising to hear submission of Mr. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Insurance Company that the appellant-Insurance Company, at the time of final hearing of the M.A.C. Case No. 106 of 2002, orally sought leave to defend the claim of the claimant No. 1/respondent on the grounds over and above the limited grounds available under section 149(2) of the MV Act. Mr. K. Pradeep, who is the Standing Counsel of the Appellant-Insurance Company, knows that the leave to defend the claim of the claimant No. 1/respondent on the grounds other than the limited grounds available under section 149(2) of the M.V. Act should be obtained before starting the case of the Appellant-Insurance Company in the M.A.C.Case No. 106 of 2002 before the learned Tribunal.

3. Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, to the contra, contends that there was no application for leave under section 170 of the M.V. Act.

4. On perusal of the Memo of the present Revision Petition, it appears that the main ground for filing the Revision Petition is that there were certain irregularities in proceeding the M.A.C. case No. 106 of 2002 inasmuch as the leave under section 170 of the M.V. Act was not granted. As stated above, in the absence of application for leave under section 170 of the M.V. Act there was absolutely no irregularity in not granting leave under section 170 of the MV Act to defend the claim of the appellant No. 1/respondent on the grounds other than the limited grounds available u/s 149 (2) of the M.V. Act.

5. Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/claimant, by referring to the decision of this Court (incidentally passed by this very court (Justice T.NK Singh) in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri Hiralal Das & Others : 2011 (2) T.A.C. 417 (Gau) strenuously contends that this Revision Petition is not maintainable.

6. This Court also perused the judgment and order of this Court in Hiralal's case (supra) and in that case it is the clear decision of this Court that a Revision Petition u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against the judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is appellable u/s 173 of the MV Act, 1908, is not maintainable. Para 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the TAC in Hiralal's case (supra) read as follows:

5. On perusal of the memo of revision petition it is clear that the petitioner-Insurance Company had taken several grounds over and above the limited grounds available under section 149(2) of the M.V. Act for assailing the impugned judgment and award.

It is so well settled that even the constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what is not permitted to do directly. If there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the constitutional authority from doing any act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by adoption of any subterfuge; and that would be clearly a fraud on the constitutional provision. Ref: Decision of the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in D.C. Wadhwa & Ors v. State of Bihar & Ors, AIR 1987 SC 579.

It is also well settled that where power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. Ref. Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 789 (C.B.).

Whereas a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, held, the power h