Section 136 of the Assam Panchayat Raj Act, 1972, by necessary implication, excludes the application of the audi alteram partem rule in cases of deadlock in the functioning of a Mahkuma Parishad.

LAHIRI, J.: - This writ appeal is projected against the judgment and order D/27-4-1981 passed in Civil Rule No. 93 of 1981.

2. Natural justice is undoubtedly a brooding omnipresence because of the strides made by the Courts in India during the last two decades but the Courts have always struck a balance between the expansion of the Rule and the empirical socio-economic needs, public interest and the authority of the legislature. The never ending process of evolution has taken note of various checks and balances. In administrative law a prima facie right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard may be held to be excluded by implication if any of the following facts is present, singly or in combination with another: (1) Where the functions of the competent authority are held to be non-judicial; (2) Where the authority in which is vested the power to decide is entrusted with a wide discretion; (3) Where the action taken constitutes denial of a privilege as distinct from interference with a right; (4) Where to impose an obligation to disclose relevant information to the party affected would be prejudicial to the public interest; (5) Where an obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action, especially action of a preventive or remedical nature; (6) Where for any other reason it is impracticable to give prior notice or opportunity to be heard; (7) Where appropriate substitutes for prior notice and opportunity to be heard are available; (8) Where legislation expressly requires notice and hearing for certain purposes but imposes no procedural requirement for the purposes; (9) Where the matter in issue or the monetary value of the interest at stake is too trivial to justify an implication that notice or opportunity to be heard be afforded before action is taken, and (10) Where the power exercised is disciplinary (Vide Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edn.) S. A. de Smith pp. 183-194). These are only illustrative cases. In Wades Administrative Law, 4th Edition this aspect has been dealt with at page 451 onwards. Lord Denning M.R in R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex p. Benaim and Khaida, (1970) 2 QB 417 (430) observed:

"It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter"

(Emphasis added).

The application of natural justice rests on statutory implication and, therefore, it must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and the subject matter of the case. Urgent actions are needed to be taken to safeguard public health or safety, viz., to seize and destroy obnoxious fish or meat exposed for sale or to order the removal to hospital of a person suffering from infectious disease, - in such cases the normal presumption must be that action may be taken without hearing. There are various urgent administrative matters where for obvious reasons no prior hearing can be granted, before taking action. There may be cases where giving of hearing may frustrate the very object of the action. In Pearlberg v.

Varty, (1972) 1 WLR 534 (540) Lord Hailsham L. C. said in the House of Lords -

"The doctrine of natural justice has come in for increasing consideration in recent years, and the Courts generally, and your Lordships House in particular, have, I think rightly, advanced its frontiers considerably. But at the same time they have taken an increasingly sophisticated view of what it requires in individual cases."

To preserve flexibility the Courts in India have frequently observed that the requirements of natural justice depend on the circumstances of each case, the nature of the inquiry, the statutory provisions under which the authority is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with. The gamut of statutory and factual context must be considered before applying the rule.

3. In this writ appeal we are concerned as to whether the legislature has by impl