This petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dibrugarh in Title Appeal No. 20 of 1980. By the aforesaid judgment the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the decree passed by the learned Sadar Munsiff, Dibrugarh in Title Suit No. 132 of 1968.

2. The opposite party herein as landlord filed the suit for ejec­tment of the present petitioner on the ground of default in payment of rent and bonafide requirement of the suit premises and for reconstruction. Petitioner denied that the opposite party herein was his landlord or that he was a defaulter. He has further denied that the suit premises is required for reconstruction as alleged.

3. The learned Court below held that the petitioner was a tenant under the opposite party ; that he was a defaulter and that the house is required for reconstruction.

4. Being conscious of the limited jurisdiction of this Court in exercising revisional powers Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the pet­itioner has urged that the impugned judgment is perverse as the learned lower appellate Court did not consider the evidence on record. This Court in the year 1955 in Giribala Chaudhnry vs. Ushangini Debi, AIR 1955 Assam 177 held that even when affirming the decision of the a Court below, the appellate Court which is the final Court of facts must independently weigh the evidence of par­ties and must do so with a clear consciousness of the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on these points. It was further held that it is, however, no part of its duty to encumber the judgment with unnecessary details, so long as the broad facts emerging from the evidence which help the Court in forming its conclusions are found to be there.

5. The Supreme Court in Girijanandini vs. Bijendra, AIR 1967 SC 1124 held that when the appellate Court agrees with the view of trial Court on evidence it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial Court and expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice.

6. So the law is well settled that the appellate Court which is the final Court of facts must weigh the evidence of the parties in­dependently but in doing so if it agrees with the views of the trial Court on evidence it need not restate the effect of evidence or to reiterate reasons given by the trial Court and expression of general agreement with reasons given by the trial Court would ord­inarily be sufficient. In the case in hand, I have perused the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court and the said judgment cannot be faulted as the learned Additional District Judge has elaborately dealt with all the points raised before him. I, therefore, reject the submission of Mr. Sarma that the impugned judgment is perverse.

7. Though the power of the revisional Court is restricted to jurisdiction only the question is whether this Court can examine the question of defaulter and bonafide requirement in a suit under Rent Law by exercising its revisional power. A Division Bench of this Court in Rankaran Agarwal vs. Radheshyam Agarwal, 1989 GHC 80 (1989 (1) GLi 135) held that a finding relating to a tenant being a defaulter or the premises being needed bonafide by a landlord1 can be inter­fered with by the High Court on a revision petition, if it is palpably wrong being based on surmises or conjectures, or in disregard of all relevant pieces of evidence which have not been controverted. The Apex Court in Binod Kumar Arora vs. Smti. Surajit Kaur. AIR 1987 SC 2179 held that the rule that when the rent controller and the appellate authority have rendered concurrent findings of fact, High Court is not entitled to disregard those findings and come to a different conclusion of its own would apply where the findings have been rendered with reference to facts and not on the basis of non-existent materials and b

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