The High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution involving a claim for damages on account of a negligent act of the Electricity Board or its officers, but it is a discretionary jurisdiction and the court may refuse to exercise it if there is an alternative remedy which is equally convenient, beneficial, and effectual.

The petitioner has filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of Mandamus commanding the Assam State Electricity Board and its officers to pay the petitioner a sum of Rupees two lakhs as compensation to him on account of the death of his daughter due to electrocution on 18.3.91 at about 5.30 AM. Shri N. N. Saikia, learned Standing Counsel for the Assam State Electricity Board, who appeared for the respondents, opposed the admission of the writ petition on the ground that the proper remedy is by way of a suit.

2. The petitioner has two adult sons and four daughters of whom three have been married. The youngest daughter Dipti Talukdar, aged about 15 years, was studying in the IXth standard. According to him, at about 5.30 AM on 18.3.91 when she was walking on the road, her leg came into contract with a broken naked electric wire lying on the road and she died by electrocution. He alleged that on the previous night a tree near his house fell down and the electric wire had snapped. Since he did not receive any compensation he caused a notice dated 10.4.91 to be sent to the respondents demanding compensation of Rs. 50,000/-. Thereafter his son wrote to the respondents seeking employment and he was asked to submit an application in proper form, which he did. Since there was no response, he has filed the writ petition.

3. In response to the objection raised on behalf of the respondents, learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. S. N. Medhi contended that on several occasions the Supreme Court as well as this Court have entertained compensa­tion claims under Article 226 of the Constitution and awarded compensation. He has cited those decisions which are considered presently.

4. One of the decisions relied upon is Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & another, AIR 1983 SC 1086 wheie the Supreme Court had to consider the relief to be granted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in a petition seeking writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner therein was acquitted of a criminal charge in 1968 but was actually released from jail only in 1982. He was in illegal detention for over fourteen years. He sought his release and asked for ancilliary reliefs like rehabilitation, reimbursement of expenses which he may have to incur for medical treatment and compensation for the illegal incarceration. The Supreme Court awarded in all a sum of Rs. 35,000/- and gave liberty to him to file suit for recovery of appropriate damages from the State and its erring officials. The Supreme Co <rt described the order of compensation as being in the nature of a palliative. Dealing with the question whether the Supreme Court should order compensation it was observed :

"It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts, Civil and Criminal. A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it But the important question for our consideration is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, this court can pass an order for the payment of money it such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases.

The petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial in the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim. But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his favour. In these circum­stances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing