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GAUHATI HIGH COURT
J.N.Sarma, J.
Manindra Kumar Dey and Another -Appellant
Versus
Mahendra Sukla Baidya and Ors. -Respondent
Second Appeal No. 188 of 1994
Decided On : 11-01-1999
EVIDENCE ACT - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS - CERTIFIED COPY OF SALE DEED - ADMISSIBILITY - REGISTRATION ACT - PRESUMPTION OF EXECUTION - SECTION 60(2) - SECTION 67 - PROOF OF EXECUTION - DISTINCTION - SALE DEED - PROOF OF CONTENTS - SECTION 79 - PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS - BENAMI TRANSACTION (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1988 - SECTION 4 - APPLICABILITY - RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs claimed ownership of three Dags of land. Defendant No. 1 sold Dags 2 and 3 to Rashmani, who sold them to Jatindra, who sold them to Plaintiff No. 1. Plaintiff No. 2 claimed Dag No. 3, which was sold by Rashmani's son to Plaintiff No. 2. Defendant No. 1 instituted a proceeding under section 145 of CrPC in respect of Dag No. 3 and possession was declared in his favor. Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of jote right over the land. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of Dag No. 3 was benami and hit by the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the certified copy of the sale deed was admissible in evidence as a public document under section 74(2) of the Evidence Act and that the presumption of correctness under section 79 applied. The Court also held that the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 did not apply retrospectively and therefore did not affect the sale of Dag No. 3.
Issues: 1. Whether the certified copy of the sale deed was admissible in evidence as a public document? 2. Whether the presumption of correctness under section 79 of the Evidence Act applied? 3. Whether the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 applied retrospectively?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A certified copy of a sale deed is admissible in evidence as a public document under section 74(2) of the Evidence Act, as it is a public record of a private document kept in the office of the Sub-Registrar. 2. The presumption of correctness under section 79 of the Evidence Act applies to certified copies of sale deeds, and therefore the contents of the sale deed were presumed to be correct. 3. The Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 does not apply retrospectively, and therefore did not affect the sale of Dag No. 3, which took place before the Act came into force.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge, and restored the decree of the trial court.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
A certified copy of a sale deed qualifies as a public document under section 74(2) of the Evidence Act, and the presumption of its correctness applies under section 79 (!) (!) .
The admissibility of the certified copy in evidence was established because it was admitted without objection, and the proper procedure for its proof was followed (!) (!) .
The distinction between admissibility and probative value is important; while a document may be admissible, its evidentiary weight depends on proper proof of execution and contents (!) .
The proof of a document's contents requires admissible evidence, especially when the truth of the facts stated is in question. Mere proof of handwriting or signature is insufficient to establish the facts or contents (!) (!) .
The validity of a sale deed can be challenged if not properly proved, but if the vendor does not contest its validity, the certified copy is generally accepted as valid evidence of the transaction (!) (!) .
The law recognizes that registration of a sale deed creates a presumption of transfer, but this presumption does not replace the need for proof under section 67 of the Evidence Act, which requires proper evidence of execution unless the presumption applies (!) .
The registration process includes endorsements and certificates that create a presumption of due execution, but this presumption cannot substitute for the actual proof of execution when witnesses are available (!) (!) .
The legal framework differentiates between original documents and registered copies, with original documents generally holding more evidentiary weight unless properly proved or admitted (!) (!) .
The admissibility of a document depends on whether the proper procedure was followed at the time of its introduction into evidence. Objections to admissibility must be raised promptly; otherwise, the document is considered properly admitted (!) (!) .
The evidentiary value of a certified copy is presumed under the law, but its strength as proof depends on compliance with statutory requirements and proper proof of execution and contents (!) (!) .
The law emphasizes the importance of proper proof for the execution of documents, including the need for witnesses or other acceptable methods to establish authenticity and contents (!) (!) .
The presumption of execution under the Registration Act does not eliminate the requirement for proof as per the Evidence Act, especially when witnesses are available to testify (!) .
In cases where the original document is not produced or properly proved, a mere certified copy may not be sufficient to establish the facts definitively (!) .
The legal principles outlined affirm that the proper procedure for proving documents, including sale deeds, involves timely objections, proper authentication, and adherence to statutory requirements to ensure the document's evidentiary value (!) (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further analysis or specific advice related to this document.
2. The brief facts are as follows: The suit land is covered by three Dags and they are- Dag No.l- area 2B 10 K, Dag No.2 - area IB 5K and Dag No.3 - area 2B OK. The plaintiff No. 1 is the father of plaintiff No. 2. The Dag Nos 1 and 2 are claimed by the plaintiff No. 1 and Dag No.3 is claimed by plaintiff No. 2. The suit land originally belonged to Mahendra Suklabaklya, the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 1 sold the entire land of Dag Nos 2 and 3 40 Rashmani Suklabaidy a by sale deed dated 17.7.1970 i.e. Ext 3. Rashmani sold Dag Nos 1 and 2 to Jatindra Dey, proforma defendant No. 2 on 7.6.1972 i.e. Ext 2. Jatindra sold the land of Dag Nos 1 and 2 to plaintiff No.l Manindra on 9.2.1978 ie Ext 1. Dag No. 3 was not sold by Rashmani. But after his death, the son Bibaran Suklabaidy a, the proforma defendant No.3 sold the land of Dag No.3 to Kami, plaintiff No.2 when he was minor on 25.10.1983, i.e. Ext 4. So the plaintiff No. l became owner of Dag Nos 1 and 2 and plaintiff No.2 became owner of Dag No.3 and as such, the plaintiffs became the owner of all the 3 Dags.
3. The defendant No. 1 Mahendra Suklabaidya instituted a proceeding under section 145 of CrPC in respect of Dag No.3 of the suit land and in the said proceeding possession was declared in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of the disputed land and thereby the title of the plaintiff was clouded. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit being Title Suit No. 17 of 1986 in the Court of the learned Assistant District Judge at Karimganj for declaration of jote right of the plaintiff No.l over Dag Nos 1 and 2 and the jote right of the plaintiff No.2 over Dag No.3 of the land. The defendant No.l only contested the suit by filing the written statement. His defence was that he is a refugee from East Pakistan and he possessed the land and later on it was allotted to him by the Govt. The defendant No.l mortgaged the suit land to one Nibaran with a condition to reconvey the same in favour of the answering defendant within the time fixed. The defendant No.l paid the entire mortgage money to Nibaran and thereafter, he continued with the exclusive possession of the land. The deeds mentioned by the plaintiffs are all fake and fabricated. The plaintiff wanted to take possession of the land forcibly and thus, there was a proceeding under section 145 of CrPC and in that proceeding, possession was declared in favour of defendant No.1.
4. As many as 5 issues were framed in the suit and plaintiff examined 5 witnesses and the contesting defendant examined himself as a witness. The learned trial Court decreed the suit by judgment dated 21.1.1993 and there was an appeal being Title Appeal No. 2 of 1993 before the learned District Judge, Karimganj. The learned District Judge found as follows :
(i) Sale by Mahendra Suklabaidya to Rashmani by Ext 3 proved.
(ii) Sale by Rashmani to Jatindra by Ext 2 proved.
(iii) Ext 1 not admissible in evidence and title did not pass to plaintiff No. 1 as the original deed of sale was not proved and only the certified copy of sale deed No.422 dated 9.2.1978 was proved by the LDA from the office of the Sub Registrar at Karimganj from the register maintained at the said Sub Registrar Office.
(iv) The title of Dag No.3 cannot be declared as it was claimed to be a benami as the plea of benami was not established and the plaintiff have not sought declaration of title of plaintiff No.2 to Dag No.3.
In view of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, the person in whose name a property is purchased shall be recorded as its real owner, meaning thereby that Dag No.3 of the land having been admittedly purchased in the name g of plaintiff No. 2 it is the plaintiff No. 2, whose name shall be recognised by law as the real owner and the question of treating the plaintiff as the owner of Dag No. 3 of the suit land does not arise at all.
Having arrived at this finding, the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. Hence this second
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