JUDGMENT

K. N. SAIKIA, J. :— This appeal by special leave is from the judgment and order dated 27-3-1978 of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench), in second appeal No. 130 of 1975, dismissing the appeal and upholding the decree of the plaintiff-respondents suit.

2. The plaintiff-respondent Prem Behari Khare instituted suit No. 42 of 1971 in the Court of Civil Judge, Mohanlal Gunj, Lucknow praying for the reliefs, inter alia, that he be declarel to be the sole and real owner of the suit house; and that the defendant-appellant be, permanently restrained from transferring the suit house. The learned Civil Judge, Lucknow, by his judgment dated 13-3-1974 decreed the suit declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and real owner of the suit house and permanently restraining the defendant from transferring the suit house to any other person. On first appeal by the defendant-appellant the learned Additional District Judge, Lucknow by his judgment dated 23-12-1974 dismissed the appeal agreeing with the findings of the trial court that it was the plaintiff-respondent who paid the consideration and purchased the suit house benami in the name of the defendant- appellant who, therefore, had no right to create any equitable mortgage or to transfer the suit house. The defendant-appellants second appeal thereafter was also dismissed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by the impugned judgment dated 27-3-1978. Hence this appeal by special leave.

3. Mr. X. B. Rohtagi learned counsel for the appellant submits, inter alia, that the learned courts below erred in holding that the suit house was not gifted by the plaintiff to the defendant but was held benami in her name; and that even if it was so held benami, the subsequent legislation, namely, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, has put a complete bar to the plaintiffs suit against the defendant in respect of the suit house.

4. Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad learned counsel for the respondent refutes submitting that the issues on gift and benami have been concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the learned courts below; and that the plaintiffs right to the benami suit house having already become final, it will not be affected by the subsequent Act.

5. The first question, therefore, is whether or not to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the learned Courts below. It has been said in a series of decisions that ordinarily this Court in an appeal will not interfere with a finding of fact which is not shown to be perverse or based on no evidence, (Babu v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1982 SC 756), but will interfere if material circumstances are ignored by the High Court. Prasad v. Govindaswami, AIR 1982 SC84. In Dhanjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 603 it was observed that where a finding of fact has been rendered by a learned single Judge of the High Court as a Court of first instance and thereafter affirmed in appeal by an Appellate Bench of that High Court, this Court should be reluctant to interfere with the finding unless there is very strong reason to do so. There is no reason why this should not apply to cases where the first appellate Court was the district Court. It was noted in Ganga Bishan v. Jay Narayan, AIR 1986 SC 441 that ordinarily this Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be averse to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the High Court and the Trial Court. But where there are material irregularities affecting the said findings or where the Court feels that justice has failed and the findings are likely to result in unduly excessive hardship this Court could not decline to interfere merely on the ground that findings in question are findings on fact. So also in Uday Chand Dutt v. Saffial Sen, AIR 1988 SC 367 it was said that in an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India where there are concurrent findings of the Courts below this Court is not called upon to reconside