2001 Supreme(Gau) 33
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
A. H. SAIKIA, J.
Ratna Paul and others -Appellant
Versus
Subhash Ranjan Paul and another -Respondent
M. F. A. No. 60 of 2000
Decided On : 16-02-2001
B. K. Das and P. K. Roy Choudhury, M. M. Lahiri and N. Choudhury
Headnote:
Injunction - Granting of temporary injunction - Assam Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 - S. 63, S. 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act - [S. 63, S. 41(h)]
Fact of the Case:
The respondent filed a suit seeking a decree declaring that the appellants did not have the right to construct any structure over the land, and for permanent injunction restraining the appellants from proceeding with any construction work. The trial Court granted temporary injunction against the appellants restraining them from proceeding with any construction work over the land till disposal of the suit.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the trial Court failed to address the three principles governing grant of temporary injunction - strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. The Court held that the respondent's apprehension of deprivation of free air and light did not give rise to a strong prima facie case. It also found that the balance of convenience was in favor of the appellants, who had already invested a significant amount in construction. The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously.
Issues: The main issue was whether the trial Court erred in granting temporary injunction against the appellants. The Court also considered the legality of the construction permission granted by the competent authority.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the respondent's apprehension of deprivation of free air and light did not establish a strong prima facie case. It also found that the balance of convenience was in favor of the appellants, who had already invested a significant amount in construction. The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously.
Final Decision: The impugned order granting temporary injunction was set aside, and the trial Court was directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
The granting of temporary injunction in favour of the Respondent/Plaintiff vide impugned order dated 26-9-2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 2 at Cachar, Silchar in Misc. Case No. 29/2000 arising out of T. N. No. 43/2000 is the sole subject matter of this Miscellaneous First Appeal.
2. Needless to remind that injunction is a form of equitable relief and has to be adjusted in the aid of equity and justice to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Granting of injunction being itself a discretionary matter, there is no straight jacket formula in the matter of granting or refusing temporary injunction. Depending on each case on its own facts, three cardinal principles governing grant of temporary injunction have been accepted, namely (i) a strong prima facie case, (ii) the balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss and injury. Ordinarily in deciding a case for seeking temporary injunction the Court must be satisfied that (a) whether a strong prima facie case, (b) the balance of convenience is in his favour i.e. it would cause greater inconvenience to him if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the opposite Party or the persons claiming through the Opposite Party would be put to if temporary injunction is granted and (c) whether the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and injury. With the first condition as sine-quo-non, the petitioner must satisfy at least two conditions conjunctively.
3. Situated with such propositions, Woodroffe has correctly observed in his book "Law relating to injunction" (12th Edn. page 101) the power which the Court possesses of granting injunctions whether interlocutory or perpetual (however salutary) should be very cautiously exercised and only upon clear and satisfactory grounds, otherwise it may work the greater injury.
4. Taking into consideration of this proposition as regards to grant of temporary injunction, the case in hand has been taken up for final disposal.
5. I have heard Mr. B. K. Das, learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Sri P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants as well as Mr. N. M. Lahiri, learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel representing the respondent.
6. I have perused the impugned order dated 26-9-2000 and entire materials available on record including the plaint, application for temporary injunction and written objections of the Opposite Parties.
7. Having gone through the aforesaid materials on record, the facts of the case appear as follows :-
8. The respondent as plaintiff has filed a T. S. No. 43/2000 before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 2 Cachar at Silchar against the appellants/O. Ps. praying inter alia, for :-
(a) a decree declaring that the appellant/defendant Nos. 1 to 3 do not have the right to construct any structure/building or portion thereof by way of construction/cantilever etc. over the land described in Schedule II below and thereby to infringe/construction the right of the plaintiff to get uninterrupted free light, air and other liberties;
(b) a decree declaring that all buildings/structures and/or extension/cantilever etc. of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are illegal, unauthorised structure and liable to be removed by demolition;
c) a decree that the construction permission issued by the defendant No. 4 Vide No. SDA-22/BP/2000-2001/2 dated 24-3-2000 is illegal, void, arbitrary, mala fide, not according to the building bye-laws of the defendant No. 4 and liable to be cancelled/set aside.
(d) for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from proceeding with any construction work over the land described in the Schedule II of the land.
9. The respondent/plaintiff in Misc. Case No. 29/2000 seeking for temporary injunction has stated that he is the owner of the land and building covered by holding No. 146, Ward No. 22 of Silchar Municipality, wherein petitioner his family members and other tenants are residing. The O.