2017 Supreme(Gau) 931
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI, ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH
KALYAN RAI SURANA, J.
UNION OF INDIA – Applicant
Versus
M/S. SUSHIL KUMAR SUNIL KUMAR - Respondent
I.A. 399,966, 930, 967, 968 of 2016 In MFA SL. No. 269237, 269239, 269238, 269234, 278964, 260500, 272180
I.A. (C) 995, 1856, 1044 Of 2016
Decided On : 30-08-2017
For the Applicants : Mr. B. Sarmah, Mr. D.K. Dey, : Mrs. U. Chakraborty, Ms. M. Das, Ms. M. Chatterjee, Ms. N.R. Rabha, : Ms. S. Bharali, Ms. U. Nanda.
For the Respondents: Mr. K.P. Maheswari, Ms. M. Sarma, Mr. A. Goyal.
Headnote:
Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 – Section 23 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5, 29 and 17 – Workmens Compensation Act, 1951 – Consumer Protection Act, 1956 – Electricity Corporation – Railways Representing – Learned counsel for respondent has raised a preliminary issue that all the interim applications have become infructuous because during pendency of this applications, the applicant Of appellant Railways representing Union of India have made payment of claim which are subject matter of all connected appeals – It is submitted that for various reasons respondents in all these cases had filed Original Applications before learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati claiming money in respect of freight charges – It is therefore submitted that even if delay is condoned and appeal is heard on merit, it would only be an academic exercise as after payment of money connected appeals have become infructuousion – Held, Learned counsels for applicants have not placed any previous judgment by this Court, which can be said to be contradictory to the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Md. Jassiruddin Talukdar there is no conflict in any two judgments in so far as this Court is concerned – Court is not persuaded to accept that ratio laid down in the case of Jassiruddin Talukdar requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of this Court should not be misunderstood that Full Bench decision of another High Court has no persuasive value at all but as this Court finds that ratio of case of Md. Jassiruddin Talukdar has been consistently followed by this Court in various judgments quoted above this Court would prefer to follow precedent of this Court – Applications stand dismissed.
1. A short but common issue involved in all these bunch of Misc. Cases Of Interim applications is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be resorted to for condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
2. Heard Mr. B. Sarmah, Mr. D.K. Dey and Mrs. U. Chakraborty, the learned counsels appearing for the applicants in all the cases. Also heard Ms. M. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in all these cases.
3. At the outset and before the commencement of the argument, the learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary issue that all the interim applications have become infructuous because during the pendency of this applications, the applicant Of appellant i.e. the Railways representing the Union of India have made payment of the claim, which are the subject matter of all the connected appeals. It is submitted that for various reasons, the respondents in all these cases had filed Original Applications before the learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati, claiming money in respect of freight charges. It is, therefore, submitted that even if the delay is condoned and the appeal is heard on merit, it would only be an academic exercise as after payment of money, the connected appeals have become infructuous. In response to the said submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents, the learned counsel for the applicants submit that they have no instructions in the matter. However, they pray for the hearing so that the issue which has been raised herein as aforesaid can be settled.
4. The learned counsel for the applicants have submitted that by applying provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is required to be made applicable for the applicants herein. In support of their arguments, the learned counsel for the applicants have relied on the cases of (i) Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Abuoobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272, and on an unreported case of (ii) Union of India Vs. Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd., Civil Appeal 12844 Of 15 [date of judgment 22.10.2016 (F.B.)]. Based on the decision in the above two cases, the learned counsels for the applicants have given their respective interpretation of Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
5. It is submitted that the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court had specifically held that it had respectfully disagreed that the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Union of India Vs. Jassiruddin Talukdar (Md.), 2011 (2) GLR 832: 2011 (2) GLT 497. The relevant paragraph No. 16 of the case of Gujarat State Electricity Corpn. Ltd. (supra) are quoted below:
“16. In the instance case, the very provision for condonation of delay, as provided under Section 17, would militate against the Act and the scheme of the Act being construed as excluding the limitation provision, as the legislature has in fact provided delay condonation power in Section 17 itself. The same power need not be provided so far as Section 23 is concerned as it pertains the appeal to be led before High Court and High Court being Court, the provisions of Section 29(2) would get attracted. Therefore, there was no requirement of providing specific power for condoning delay. The legislature, if at all, wanted to exclude the power in the High Court for condoning delay in filing of appeal, then legislature would have by way of express provision excluded the same. With profound respect to the High Court of Gauhati and High Court of Madhya Pradesh, this Court is unable to accept the proposition that the provision of the Act and the scheme based upon its object and reason, could be said to be one in which the provisions of Limitation Act appears to have been excluded. On the contrary, the provision of Section 17 expressly contains delay condonation power without there being any