2018 Supreme(Gau) 1718
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI AT KOHIMA BENCH
S. SERTO, J.
C. Thangpong – Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner and Secretary, Deptt. of Veterinary and Animal Husbandry – Respondent
WP (C) No. 97(K) of 2015
Decided On : 24-08-2018
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. T. Koza, Mr. Z. Zho, Mr. Moa Jamir, Mr. Taka Kichu, Ms. Vitsino.
For the Respondent: Mr. Moa Imchen, Mr. R. Iralu, Mr. K.L. Solo, Ms. Mhabeni Tongoue, Mr. Daniel.
Headnote:
Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16(1) – Issue on Appointment Order –learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no one had challenged the petitioners appointment order, therefore, the legality and validity of the same cannot be questioned anymore –The learned counsel also further submitted that the petitioners case is not based on land ownership but it is based on the question of principle of law that is whether one ad hoc appointment can be replaced by other ad hoc appointment –Held, To remove a person who has already been appointed for unreasonable reason or reasons which cannot be justified and appoint another person in his place would definitely be arbitrary and discriminatory – In such a situation, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Piara Singh (supra) referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner would definitely be applicable though the word used in that judgment does not included contingency appointment –The two kind of appointments, i.e., ad hoc appointment and contingency appointment are same in nature because they are made to meet exigencies in the service and they both are temporary –Taking into account the spirit of that judgment in the facts and circumstances of the case, Court is of the view that the removal of the petitioner from service and the appointment of the respondent No. 3 in his place on the same basis is not sustainable in law –Therefore, the removal order of the petitioner and the appointment of the respondent No. 3 in his place are quashed and set aside –In consequence, the respondents are directed to restore the petitioner to the post/ position till permanent appointment is made through regular appointment –Writ Petition disposed of
ORDER :
1. Heard Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. Moa Imchen, learned Addl. senior Government advocate appearing for all the State respondents as well as Mr. R. Iralu, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Mhabeni for the respondent No. 3.
2. The petitioner was appointed on contingency basis as chowikdar with a fixed pay of Rs. 3,000 p.m. at VHC, Sanglao on land ownership basis with a condition that he can be terminated any time without further notice. After serving almost a year, on 6.2.2015, the petitioner's service was terminated with immediate effect, vide order dated 6.2.2015, issued by the Director of Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland, Kohima, vide his Office Memo No. VET/EST-3/TSG/II(Pt)/2014-15. On the same day, in his place, the respondent No. 3 (Mr. T. Hamphai) was appointed on contingency basis with fixed pay of Rs. 3,000 p.m. with effect from the date of joining the post, vide order dated 6.2.2015, issued by the same Director of Veterinary & A.H. Nagaland, vide his Office Memo No. VET/EST-3/TSG/ 11(Pt)/2014-15, with the same conditions that he can be terminated any time without further notice. Aggrieved by the said two orders, one terminating him from service and the other appointing the respondent No. 3, the petitioner has come to this court praying for setting aside and quashing the two orders and at the same time praying for issuance of appropriate writ or order or directions directing the respondents to reinstate him in service.
3. The case of the petitioner as submitted by Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel is based on three grounds. The first ground strongly urged by the learned counsel of the petitioner is as follows:
If the Government respondents have removed the petitioner in order to fill up the post on permanent or regular basis by advertising the post, the petitioner would not have a case, however, when a person appointed on contingency basis is terminated and another appointment is made in his place by another appointment of the same nature, it would be against the principle of law established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118, paras 45 and 46. The contents of the two paras are extracted here below:
“45. The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an ad hoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation, effort should always be to replace such an ad hoc/temporary employee by a regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc/temporary employee.
46. Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.”
The second ground submitted by the learned counsel is that the petitioner was removed from service without serving any notice or without giving any chance of being heard, therefore, the impugned order removing him is against the principle of natural justice. The learned counsel went on to submit that even a temporary employee deserves to be given notice and opportunity of being heard before being terminated from service. The learned counsel in support of his submission cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of The Manager, Government of Branch Press vs. D.B. Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477. The contents of para 18 of the said judgment are extracted here below:
“18. Mr. Veerappa's first contention is that articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution have no application, whatever, to the case