The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for close scrutiny of evidence from child witnesses, the need for corroboration of their testimony, and the practical reasoning required for their evidence to inspire confidence in the court.

JUDGMENT :

Michael Zothankhuma, J.

Heard Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned Amicus Curiae and Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Mizoram.

2. This appeal has been filed challenging the Judgment and Order dated 27.10.2022 passed by the Fast Track Special Court, POCSO Act, Aizawl in SC No. 35/2021 (Criminal Trial No. 590/2021), by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, Rigorous Imprisonment for a further period of 3 months.

3. The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR dated 27.01.2021 was submitted by Prosecution Witness No. 1 (PW-1) to the Officer-in-Charge, All Women Police Station, Aizawl stating that her daughter had been sexually molested by their neighbour, Sh. Lalkamlova (appellant) at the appellant’s and the victim’s residence, during the period from December, 2020 to 25.01.2021. Pursuant to the FIR, AW.PS Case No.1/2021 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 376 AB IPC was registered on 27.01.2021. After investigation of the case, the I.O submitted a chargesheet, on finding a prima facie case against the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 376 AB IPC.

4. The learned Trial Court thereafter framed charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, read with Section 376 AB IPC against the appellant, which was denied by the appellant and claimed trial. During the trial proceedings, 8 prosecution witnesses and 1 defence witness were examined by the learned Trial Court. During examination of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC, the appellant denied the evidence that had been adduced against him. The learned Trial Court thereafter came to a finding that the appellant was guilty of having committing the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim.

The appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced accordingly, as stated in the foregoing paragraphs.

5. The learned Amicus Curiae has taken us through the evidence produced by the prosecution witnesses and has stated that there is nothing to show that the learned Trial Court was satisfied that the minor witnesses, i.e. the prosecutrix (PW No. 2), her cousin PW No. 3 and PW No. 4 (the youngest sister of the prosecutrix), were in a position to give rational answers and had understood the questions put forth to them by the learned Trial Court. He thus submits that the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the evidence of minor witnesses was not sustainable.

6. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that the statement of the victim was to have been recorded in her residence or in a place where the victim usually resides. However, in the present case, the statement of the victim had been recorded in the Police Station, which was not in consonance with Section 24 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The learned Amicus Curiae also submits that there is a possibility of the prosecutrix having been tutored to implicate the appellant in the false case. He also submits that the prosecutrix, in her testimony given before the Court during trial, did not state that the appellant had inserted his private parts into her private parts. However, the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.PC had clearly stated that the appellant had inserted his private parts into the victim’s private parts. He submits that in view of the discrepancy in the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.PC vis-a-vis the testimony given during trial, the same gives rise to an inference that the prosecutrix was not a reliable witness and also not capable of giving a truthful testimony. He also submits that when there are two views possible on the evidence recorded, the view favourable to the accused should be accepted by the Court.

In support of his submission that it is the duty of the learned Trial Court to satisfy itself as to whether the child is capable of giving a rational answer, after understa