The central legal point established in the judgment is the impermissibility of granting bail based on trial delay under the UA(P) Act, 1967, and the emphasis on considering the intention or state of mind of the accused in cases involving support to terrorist organizations.

JUDGMENT :

N. Kotiswar Singh, J.

Heard Mr. D.K. Das, learned senior counsel assis ted by Ms. K. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-National Investigation Agency (NIA). Also heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. A. Sangtam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

2. In this appeal, the appellant has challenged the order dated 16.3.2021 passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Dimapur, Nagaland in I.A.(Crl.) No. 40/2021 arising out of R.C01/2016/NIA-GUW by which the respondent was granted bail, on the ground that though the trial court gave a finding that the accusation against the respondent is prima facie true, yet, proceeded to grant bail to the respondent on the spacious ground that the trial would take long time inasmuch as only few witnesses have been examined out of long list of witnesses.

3. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the aforesaid approach of the trial court is not permissible inasmuch as there is no provision for grant of bail on such ground except on the ground that the accusation against the person charged of offence under UA(P) Act, 1967 covered under Chapters IV and VI of the UA(P) Act are not prima facie true. Thus, if the trial court comes to the conclusion that the accusation against the respondent is prima facie true, that should have been sufficient to deny the bail. However, instead of doing so, the trial court based on certain other grounds which are not contemplated under the law governing bail under UA(P) Act, released the respondent on bail by treating to be a normal bail application which is not, otherwise, permissible.

4. On the other hand, Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that though the trial court had gave a finding that the accusations against the respondent are prima facie true, the said finding was given on the basis of law which was considered not proper in view of the subsequent decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that regard.

5. It has been submitted by learned senior counsel for the respondent that the basic accusation against the respondent is that she had paid certain amount of money to the NSCN(K) which, however, has been explained by saying that the same had been paid under duress and not voluntarily.

6. It has been submitted by learned senior counsel for the respondent that unless there is a clear intention to make such contribution voluntarily, i.e., an intention to fund or contribute to a terrorist organization, it cannot be said to be offence as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudesh Kedia v. Union of India, (2021) 4 SCC 704.

7. In this regard, Mr. Dutta, learned senior counsel has drawn attention of this court to para No. 13.1 of aforesaid Sudesh Kedia (supra) wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows,

“13.1 A close scrutiny of the material placed before the court would clearly show that the main accusation against the appellant is that he paid levy/extortion amount to the terrorist organisation. Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding. It is clear from the supplementary charge sheet and the other material on record that other accused who are members of the terrorist organization have been systematically collecting extortion amounts from businessmen in Amrapali and Magadh areas. The appellant is carrying on transport business in the area of operation of the organisation. It is alleged in the second supplementary charge sheet that the appellant paid money to the members of the TFC for smooth running of his business. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the appellant conspired with the other members of the TPC and raised funds to promote the organisation.”

8. It has been submitted by learned senior counsel for the respondent that the payment was made on duress to the extortion amount, not voluntarily for if the payment is not made, the life and limb of the respondent would be under serious threat and as such, it cannot be said that the respondent