IMPORTANT POINT
The court affirmed that procedural compliance and prior misconduct can justify the cancellation of a PDS license under the Assam Public Distribution of Articles Order, 1982.

JUDGMENT :

SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI, J.

1. An order dated 01.04.2013 of cancellation of the PDS license in the name of the petitioner is the subject matter of challenge in this petition. The said order was upheld by the appellate authority as well as the second appellate authority and thereafter, the writ petition has been filed.

2. As per the facts projected, the petitioner was the license holder for distribution of SK Oil. Initially such distribution was done in the ratio of 70:30 through PDS and through Hawkers. In the course of this business, there were complaints by the Hawkers Association on the issue that the petitioner was not allotting adequate materials to them and was rather allotting the materials to certain non-license holders. On the aforesaid allegation, initially an order was passed on 24.03.2009, whereby the license of the petitioner was suspended. A show-cause notice was also issued to him, which the petitioner had replied. Thereafter, on 10.08.2009, the suspension order was revoked by the SDO (Civil). Such revocation was however restricted to 70% of the distribution which was to be done through PDS and so far as the 30% was concerned, which was to be done through Hawkers, the same was given to a third party. The Hawkers’ Association, which has been arrayed as the respondent no. 5, had filed a writ petition against the order of revocation dated 10.08.2009. The said writ petition was disposed of by remanding the parties to take the recourse of preferring an appeal, as provided in law. The appeal, so preferred by the respondent no. 5-Association, was allowed and the suspension was restored. Being aggrieved, the petitioner had filed WP(C)/5603/2009, which was disposed of vide an order dated 04.05.2010 allowing the same. The said the writ petition was allowed mainly on the grounds that the documents pertaining to the allegations were not provided to the petitioner and that he was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend. Be that as it may, the respondent no. 5-Association had preferred WA/179/2010. The Hon’ble Division Bench however, vide order dated 01.10.2012 had allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner. On such remand, the Deputy Commissioner, after consideration of the matter, had ultimately passed the order dated 01.04.2013 of cancellation of the license. As indicated above, both the appeal and the second appeal of the petitioner have been dismissed.

3. I have heard Shri S. Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Shri M. Chetia, learned State Counsel whereas Shri A.M. Barbhuiya, learned counsel is present for the respondent no. 5-Association.

4. Shri Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner has formulated his submissions in the following manner:

(i) The initial writ petition filed by the petitioner being WP(C)/5603/2009 was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 04.05.2010 on certain specific grounds. Though, the Hon’ble Division Bench in its order dated 01.10.2012 had remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the Deputy Commissioner, there were no specific interference with the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge and therefore, those have attained finality.

(ii) In view of the findings of the learned Single Judge in the order dated 04.05.2010 having attained finality, the scope of the Deputy Commissioner in reconsidering the matter after its remand was a limited one wherein only those matters which were outside the findings could have been considered.

(iii) In the remand, a new ground was taken by the respondent no. 5-Association involving serious allegation of monetary transaction for an amount of Rs.2.24 lakhs approximately. It is submitted that the aforesaid could not have been taken as it was not within the scope of the remand order. It is also submitted that the aforesaid aspects was not taken into consideration either by the first appellate authority or the second appellate authority and therefore, there is a necessity for interference with the i