Appointments to public posts must adhere to legal procedures; individuals appointed illegally cannot claim rights to notice before termination.

JUDGMENT & ORDER :

BUDI HABUNG, J.

Heard Mr. I. Imchen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. Livika, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents.

2. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner challenges letter No. NL/AC-83/87(Vol-II) dated 31.10.2019 and termination notice No. AC/ESTT/ED-NG/394/2019-20/793 dated 8.11.2019. In the letter dated 31.10.2019, the Under Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Department of Art & Culture, wrote to the Director of Art & Culture regarding the termination of 13 (thirteen) Gr. III & IV irregular appointees. The petitioner’s name appeared at Sl. No. 1 in this letter. Subsequently, by notice dated 8.11.2019, the Additional Director & Head of Department of Art & Culture served the termination notice to the petitioner.

3. The petitioner’s case, in brief, is that upon learning that a vacant post of LDA under the establishment of the District Culture Office (hereinafter referred to as DCO) was available, she applied for the post. Her application was considered and approved via letter No. AC/ESTT/1/2010 dated 1.9.2017, in her favor for appointment to the said post, where her name appeared at Sl. No. 8 on the waitlist. Following the approval letter dated 1.9.2017, the petitioner was appointed to the post of LDA (District) under the establishment of DCO, Peren, via order No. AC/ESTT/BOI/15-16(P) dated 1.9.2017, on a regular basis, with the condition that the appointment could be terminated with one month’s notice from either side in writing. The petitioner subsequently joined her duties.

4. The petitioner contends that while she was serving in the Department, the Under Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Department of Art & Culture, issued the impugned letter dated 31.10.2019 to the Director of Art & Culture for the termination of 13 (thirteen) Gr. III & IV irregular appointees, with the petitioner’s name listed at Sl. No. 1. This proposal was initiated and approved by the Chief Minister of Nagaland. Based on the aforementioned impugned letter dated 31.10.2019, the Additional Director & Head of Department of Art & Culture served the impugned termination notice dated 8.11.2019 to the petitioner. The reason for issuing the termination notice was that the petitioner was appointed without following the proper procedure for appointments in government service.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was appointed by order dated 1.9.2017, with the condition that the appointment could be terminated with one month’s notice from either side in writing. However, by the impugned termination notice dated 8.11.2019, the petitioner’s service was effectively terminated one month after the issuance of the notice. The learned counsel argues that the respondent authorities should have provided the petitioner with an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the actions of the respondent authorities are illegal, arbitrary, and violate the principles of natural justice; thus, the impugned letter dated 31.10.2019 and the termination notice dated 8.11.2019 should be quashed and set aside.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that while issuing the impugned termination notice, the respondent authorities should have considered that the petitioner had already served for more than two years with due sincerity and devotion and that she is now over-aged for any public employment. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satwati Deswal vs State of Haryana and Others reported in (2010) 1 SCC 126, whereby at paragraphs 4 and 5, it is observed as under:

“4. Admittedly, in this case, no show-cause notice was issued to her nor the order of termination was passed by initiating any departmental proceeding after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant. This order of termination was challenged by the appellant by way of a writ petition before the