An injunction cannot be granted when the underlying contract is contingent, as it violates the principles of specific performance and appellate jurisdiction.

JUDGMENT :

(DEVASHIS BARUAH, J.)

Heard Mr. Bhaskar Dutta, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S Deka, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. Also heard Mr. DK Mishra, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. B Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

2. This is an appeal under Section 104 read with Order XLI, Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (for short, ‘the Code’) challenging the order dated 09.01.2025 passed in Misc.(J) Case No.280/2024 arising out of Title Suit No.177/2024 by the Court of the learned Civil Judge, (Senior Division) No.1, Cachar at Silchar (for short, ‘the learned Trial Court’) whereby the Appellants herein have been restrained from alienating the title or transferring the possession of the Schedule –A property i.e. 60% of the share of the Appellants to any third party or from changing the nature and feature of the same, till the disposal of the main suit.

3. For the sake of convenience, the Appellants herein are referred to as the Principal Defendants and the respondent is referred to as the plaintiff as were their status before the learned Trial Court.

SCOPE OF THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION

4. At the outset, it is relevant to the take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Anr. vs Antox India P. Ltd. reported in 1990 Suppl. SCC 727 wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court against an order of injunction passed by the Court of the first instance. The Supreme Court in the said judgment opined that an appeal against the exercise of discretion by the Court of the first instance cannot be interfered with unless the discretion so exercised is arbitrary, capricious, perverse or where the court of the first instance had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. Paragraph 14 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced hereinunder:

“The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721)

“...These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of