R. Basant, J.

Is an appeal maintainable under S.29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as " the Act") against an interim exparte order passed under S.23 of the Act? This crucial question is to be decided in this Crl.M.C. The parties are being referred to in this order in the manner in which they are ranked before the learned Magistrate.

2. The petitioners - mother and her child, had approached the learned Magistrate with an application under S.12 of the Act claiming relief under Ss.19 and 20 of the Act. The learned Magistrate passed an exparte interim order, copy of which is produced as Annexure-4, directing the 1 respondent/alleged husband to allow the petitioners to reside in his house and restraining him from causing any disturbance to the peaceful residence of the petitioners in that house. There was also a further exparte interim direction that the 1st respondent must pay an amount of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.1,250/- per mensem to petitioners 1 and 2 respectively. That order was passed on 01.01.2007. The respondents thereupon rushed to the Sessions Court and the Sessions Court after admitting the appeal granted an interim stay. Copy of that order is produced as Annexure-6. The order of the Magistrate was suspended on condition that the petitioner shall execute a bond for Rs.5,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the court below within a period of one month from the date of the said order.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that no appeal under S.29 is at all maintainable against an interim exparte order passed under S.23. In these circumstances, he contends that the entertainment of the appeal by the learned Sessions Judge is not legal and justified.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contends that at any rate, the insensitive manner in which the order of suspension/stay (Annexure-6) was granted, is objectionable and the learned Sessions Judge did not apply his mind to the nature of the relief that was granted to the petitioners or the contentions of the parties before the said blanket order of suspension was granted.

5. The contentions call for a detailed consideration of the provisions of-S:29 of the Act. It will be apposite in this context to refer to the scheme of the Act. Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act clearly show that the Act is a piece of civil law conferring on the victim women civil rights. Provision is also made for the redressal of their grievances through the structure provided under the criminal law. It will be apposite to alertly note that the Act is a piece of civil law which is sought to be implemented through the instrumentality of the courts constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The only penal provision in the Statute against a party - respondent is the one in S.31 of the Act. Chapter 1 containing Sections 1 and 2 deals only with the short title, extent and commencement and the definitions. Shared household is defined in S.2(s) and domestic violence is defined in S.2(g) read with S.3 of the Act. Chapter 2 has only one Section and that (S.3) deals with the definition of the expression `domestic violence'. Chapter 3 containing Sections 4 to 11 deals with the procedure for appointment of protection officers, service providers etc. and their powers and duties. Chapter 4 containing Ss.12 to 29 deals with the reliefs that can be granted and the orders that can be passed and the procedure to be followed by, the Magistrate before passing orders granting such relief. The provision for appeal against such orders are available in S.29. Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous provisions.

6. We are particularly concerned with Chapter 4. The nature of the orders that can be passed are enumerated in S.18 - which deals with protection orders, S.19 - which deals with residence orders, S.20 - which deals with monetary relief, S.21 - which deals with custody orders a