The employer Mother Superior of an English medium school, challenges the refusal on the part of the Labour Court to deal with Ext.P3 application for setting aside Ext.P2 award as also Ext.P4 application wherein the prayer was to condone the delay caused in filing of Ext.P3.

2. The second respondent was working as an "Aya" in the petitioner's school. Alleging denial of work with effect from 18.10.1994. She approached the Labour Authorities which resulted in reference of the dispute to the Labour Court as per order dated 13.5.1996. The then Mother Superior filed written objections before the Labour Court; but she passed away on 22.2.2003, with the result that when the matter came up for consideration before the Labour Court on 21.5.2002, there was no one to represent the management. It was in these circumstances, Ext.P2 award was passed ex-parte on 21.5.2002.

3. Exts.P3 and P4 were filed only on 30.10.2002. It is stated that all those connected with the institution were bereaved or their normal work was paralysed due to the sudden and unexpected demise of the Mother Superior and that is the reason why they could not take steps for setting aside the award promptly. The prayer now is that in the circumstances, this court may interfere in the matter and direct the consideration of Exts.P3 and P4 and also direct the Labour Court to set a side the ex-parte order.

4. It is Rule 23 of the Kerala Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, that governs the setting aside of exparte decision as sought for in Ext.P3 as also condonation of delay as sought for in Ext.P4. The said provision reads as follows:

"3. Setting aside exparte decision:- The Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may for sufficient cause set aside after notice to the opposite party the exparte decision either wholly or in part on an application made within fifteen days of the exparte decision. The Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or arbitrator may extend the time on sufficient cause being shown."

5. The built in provision enabling condonation of delay available in Rule 23(1) enables extension of time on showing sufficient cause. But then, there are other provisions in the Act itself which provide that on publication of the award which also has a time limit it attains finality.

6. The question whether after an award has become final, it could be set aside invoking the power under Rule 23 came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (1980 (Supp) SCC 420). The Apex Court noted that Section 20(3) of the Act provides that proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to be continued till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under S.17A; that the award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication under S.17 and that a combined reading of these would lead to the inference that proceedings with reference to S.10 of the Act shall be deemed to be concluded on the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. It was further held on this basis that the Tribunal would retain jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication only until the said time limit and consequently it will have power to entertain any application relating to the dispute including under S.23 only until such stage of finality is reached. In view of the said decision the Tribunal, obviously, did not have jurisdiction to entertain Exts.P3 and P4 and I do not find any defect in the refusal of the Labour Court to act upon these applications in the circumstances.

7. Relying on the decision in Paily Vs. Muthaih (1991 (2) KLT 512) it was argued that invoking power under Art.226 this Court can set aside Ext.P2 award when it is obvious that the decision works out gross injustice. The Court noted on the facts of that case that the workman was holding a position of trust; that there was forgery committed by him and therefore Single Judge of the High Court was justified in the interference with regard to